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THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES 
ACT: TOWARD A DEFINITION OF 
“FOREIGN OFFICIAL” 
INTRODUCTION 
he Mexican government is the only entity permitted to 
own and exploit Mexico’s natural resources, and as such, 
it may create other entities tasked with the management and 
distribution of those resources.1 The Mexican government has 
used this mandate to create a petroleum company, Petróleos 
Mexicanos (“PEMEX”), which it wholly owns.2 The Mexican 
government appoints every member of the PEMEX governing 
board and employs PEMEX’s other employees, as well.3 
Exxon and Occidental are both American petroleum compa-
nies that compete for the ability to drill for oil in Mexican wa-
ters, and the Mexican government has authorized PEMEX to 
grant those concessions.4 Consider the following hypothetical:5 
Exxon submits a bid of $95 million6 for the drilling concession 
and Occidental submits one worth $100 million. PEMEX has 
made no indication of which company it plans to choose, but 
arranges to select the winning bid and award the contract at a 
public ceremony to which both companies are invited.7 During 
the ceremony, but before PEMEX awards the contract, the 
chief executive officer and chairman of Exxon gives the chief 
executive officer of PEMEX a check for $10 million, at which 
point PEMEX awards Exxon the drilling concession.8 
Now, consider the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(“FCPA”).9 The FCPA prohibits paying bribes to foreign offi-
                                                                                                             
 1. United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1119–20 (C.D. Cal. 
2011). 
 2. Id. (noting that the PEMEX website indicates that it is “[a] govern-
ment agency . . . created and . . . owned by the Mexican government.”). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. The Central District of California posed this hypothetical in the course 
of Aguilar. Id. at 1119–20. 
 6. All figures are in U.S. Dollars. 
 7. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1119–20. 
 8. Id. at 1119–20. 
 9. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act [FCPA], 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1–78dd-3 
(1998). 
T
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cials to improperly attain business abroad.10 Under the FCPA, 
a “foreign official” is “any officer or employee of a foreign gov-
ernment or any department, agency, or instrumentality there-
of, or of a public international organization, or any person act-
ing in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such [enti-
ty].”11 
Do Exxon’s actions fit within that framework? Should the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) prosecute one or both of the par-
ties for violating the FCPA? Is the president of PEMEX even a 
“foreign official”? The Central District of California in United 
States v. Aguilar asked the defendants during a hearing on this 
exact hypothetical, 
whether any responsible Congressional leader would respond 
to such a DOJ inquiry by saying, “No, do not prosecute Exxon 
or its CEO, because PEMEX is a state-owned corporation and 
it was not the intention of Congress to consider any corpora-
tion an ‘instrumentality’ of any foreign government, regard-
less of the other facts warranting prosecution.”12 
The defendants answered the inquiry by suggesting that a 
Congressional leader may indeed respond in just such a way, 
provided he was uninfluenced by political considerations and 
elections.13 Although the court posited that “whether injected 
with truth serum or not, members of Congress would not deem 
such a prosecution to be beyond the purview of the FCPA mere-
ly because PEMEX is a state-owned corporation,”14 the debate 
has yet to be officially resolved in American jurisprudence. In 
fact, the Aguilar court posed this hypothetical precisely be-
cause it found that the legislative history of the FCPA did not 
point directly towards including or excluding employees of 
state owned corporations within the definition of “foreign offi-
cial.”15 
                                                                                                             
 10. Id. 
 11. FCPA, § 78dd-2(h)(2)(A). 
 12. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1120. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 1119. As this Note went to print, the DOJ issued a guidance in-
dicating that it does consider these employees within the purview of the 
FCPA. Although the guidance is “non-binding, informal, and summary in 
nature,” it will be a useful tool for the courts when faced with defining “for-
eign official.” See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE AND SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, FCPA: A 
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Despite the potential ambiguity in the statute, the DOJ has 
been prosecuting a growing number of actions pursuant to the 
FCPA, increasing from five in 2004 to seventy-four in 2010.16 
The settlement figures are also on the rise, with half of the ten 
biggest FCPA settlements, which in some cases topped $350 
million, occurring in 2010.17 This continued increase may be 
attributable in part to the Obama Administration, evidenced by 
U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder’s 2009 proclamation that, 
because corruption is a “scourge on civil society” and “one of the 
greatest struggles of our time,”18 it requires vigilant enforce-
ment. Yet even before the current administration, the DOJ and 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) began in-
creasing enforcement following the set of amendments that ex-
panded the FCPA’s scope in 1998.19 Additionally, the DOJ and 
SEC began encouraging firms to disclose FCPA violations vol-
untarily, and the firms have been doing so with greater fre-
quency, as a result of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its disclosure 
requirements.20 
For many industries, doing business in corruption-prone are-
as may be something that simply comes with the territory, re-
quiring a balancing between pursuing international business 
                                                                                                             
RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT aii, 19–21 
(2012). 
 16. Bribery Abroad: A Tale of Two Laws, ECONOMIST (Sept. 17, 2011) 
http://www.economist.com/node/21529103. 
 17. Id. (“[R]ecent years have seen a spike in enforcement, from five actions 
in 2004 to 74 in 2010. Five of the ten biggest settlements ever were last year, 
including a $400 [million] fine against BAE systems, a British defense con-
tractor, and a $365 [million] fine against ENI, an Italian oil firm.”). 
 18. Jon Jordan, Recent Developments in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
and the New UK Bribery Act: A Global Trend Towards Greater Accountability 
in the Prevention of Foreign Bribery, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 845, 861 (2011). 
 19. Lucinda A. Low, Owen Bonheimer & Negar Katirai, Enforcement of the 
FCPA in the United States: Trends and the Effects of International Stand-
ards, 1665 PLI/CORP. 711, 715 (2008). 
 20. Id. at 742–43; Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 
Stat. 745 (2002). Enacted on July 30, 2002 in an effort to curb corporate 
fraud, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act “regulat[es] accounting practices, imposes dis-
closure requirements on directors and officers and the corporations them-
selves as well as increases the penalties for violations of federal securities 
laws.” John F. Olson, Josiah O. Hatch, & Ty R. Sagalow, Possible Liabilities 
of Officers and Directors under Federal and State Statutes, in DIR. & OFF. 
LIAB § 3:139 (Nov. 2011). 
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opportunities and avoiding running afoul of U.S. law. 21 For ex-
ample, in the energy industry, “the work of navigating ancient 
kingdoms and secretive relationships has become an integral 
part of finding new [oil] reserves, . . . [and] has led the industry 
. . . to the most difficult corners of the earth.”22 These energy 
companies, and other types of businesses, have been targeted 
in the upswing of DOJ and SEC prosecutions under the FCPA 
that began in 2004.23 Likewise, Wal-Mart, which has been rap-
idly expanding across the globe, found itself in trouble in Mexi-
co in early 2012, and Hollywood studios have had to answer 
similar questions about their dealings in China and the accom-
panying FCPA implications.24 
These businesses will also need to conform to the United 
Kingdom Bribery Act 2010 (“U.K. Act”), which was passed in 
2010 and went into effect in July 2011.25 This statute is even 
broader in scope and more restrictive than the FCPA, even if 
some consider it “better crafted,” because it is also fairer to 
firms.26 The U.K. Act provides a compliance defense, which pro-
tects honest firms from suffering the most severe of conse-
quences if a briber was “one rogue employee,” and the firm had 
a clear and effective anti-bribery program.27 Regardless of the 
U.K. Act’s specific content, there can be no doubt that it pre-
sents additional anti-corruption hurdles that global businesses 
must meet if they want to avoid the courtroom.28 
As can be expected, the enthusiasm of the DOJ and SEC for 
the FCPA is not shared universally.29 Some have suggested 
                                                                                                             
 21. Nathan Vanderklippe, Jumping through hoops to win business in Lib-
ya: Canadian corporations face a thicket of ethical questions, hazy laws back 
home and local government greed, GLOBE & MAIL, Mar. 22, 2011, at A20. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Thomas McSorley, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
749, 751 (Spring 2011); see also Vanderklippe, supra note 21. 
 24. See David Barstow, Vast Mexico Bribery Case Hushed Up by Wal-Mart 
After Top-Level Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2012, at A1; Edward Wyatt, 
Michael Cieply, and Brookes Barnes, S.E.C. Asks if Hollywood Paid Bribes in 
China, N.Y. TIMES, April 25, 2012, at B1. 
 25. Bribery Abroad, supra note 16; Chris Borg, Emma Radmore, and Mad-
eleine de Remusat, Bribery Act 2010: No More Excuses, COMPLIANCE 
MONITOR, May 2011, at 1. 
 26. Bribery Abroad, supra note 16. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See id. 
 29. Shawn McCarthy, Resource curse puts companies in crosshairs: U.S.-
listed Canadian firms will be included in SEC international anti-corruption 
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that this vigorous enforcement of the FCPA essentially serves 
as a “de facto sanction” against these corruption-prone coun-
tries,30 while many players in big business see the FCPA as in-
jurious to the United States’ competitive advantage and as a 
major hindrance to business profitability.31 Essentially, they 
believe the FCPA “holds [American companies] to a higher 
standard” than their foreign competitors, which are permitted 
to conduct their business in a way that would technically vio-
late the FCPA.32 The statute’s additional restraints on Ameri-
can companies thus negatively affect their ability to compete in 
those markets.33 The high chance of violating the FCPA and 
facing prosecution discourages about a third of British and a 
quarter of American companies from doing business in coun-
tries that are prone to corruption.34 Due to concerns about “on-
erous compliance costs and competitive disadvantage,” some 
companies would “prefer the rule-making be harmonized 
among major trading partners to reduce the potential for prob-
lems.”35 Although such harmonization would require significant 
work from the outset, an essential starting point, which would 
greatly improve companies’ ability to plan their business 
abroad, would be solidifying a definition of “foreign official.”36 
The particular question of how to define a “foreign official” 
under the FCPA is at issue for any type of corporation looking 
                                                                                                             
rules, GLOBE & MAIL, Feb. 22, 2011, at B3 (“The oil industry, in particular, is 
raising alarms.”). 
 30. Id. 
 31. See generally David S. Hilzenrath, Can You Spot the Bribe? American 
Businesses Cannot Either, WASH. POST, July 24, 2011, at G01 [hereinafter 
Hilzenrath, Spot?]; McCarthy, supra note 29; David S. Hilzenrath, The Price 
of Global Business (in a Briefcase Full of Cash), WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 2011, 
at A14 [hereinafter Hilzenrath, Price]. 
 32. Hilzenrath, Price, supra note 31 (quoting regulatory filing of Diebald, 
an Ohio-based producer of automatic teller machines). 
 33. Id. (quoting regulatory filing of Diebald, an Ohio-based producer of 
automatic teller machines). 
 34. Bribery Abroad, supra note 16. 
 35. McCarthy, supra note 29. 
 36. See Bribery Abroad, supra note 16; Bruce Zagaris, U.S. Trade Associa-
tions Request Better Guidance on FCPA Implementation, 28 INT’L 
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 182, 182 (2012); Tom Hamburger, Brady Dennis & Jia 
Lynn Yang, Wal-Mart Took Part in Lobbying Campaign to Amend Anti-
Bribery Law, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 2012, at A01. 
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to do business abroad.37 Energy companies are an illustrative 
example of the “foreign official” ambiguity problem because 
many energy companies are nationalized, wholly or partially, 
so their agents may arguably be considered public officials. Any 
U.S. companies looking to operate in compliance with the law, 
then, need to be able to identify which energy sector agents 
may trigger FCPA liability, though all too often this proves to 
be a difficult task.38 Recent cases in the United States address 
the definition of “foreign official,” however, the courts have yet 
to provide a clear one.39 
When a statute’s text is ambiguous, courts may “turn to the 
legislative history to ascertain Congress’s intent.”40 Additional-
ly, if the legislative history is inconclusive, the court may apply 
the rule of lenity and construe the statute in favor of the de-
fendant (in the case of “foreign official,” narrowly).41 However, 
“[t]he rule of lenity applies only where . . . resort[ing] to any 
and all other sources still results in a tie as to the proper inter-
pretation.”42 Therefore, reviewing the stated motivations for 
enacting anti-corruption legislation in the United States, the 
U.K., and relevant international organizations, and subsequent 
                                                                                                             
 37. Joel M. Cohen et al., Under the FCPA, Who is a Foreign Official Any-
way?, 63 BUS. LAW. 1243, 1245–46 (2008). 
 38. See id. at 1268–69. Although some nations are trending towards pri-
vatizing nationally-owned companies rather than nationalizing private com-
panies, that transition is often caught in a state of limbo, leaving those com-
panies still partially state-owned. To provide one example, Iran privatized all 
of its major industries but specifically excluded its oil and gas industry from 
that process. Id. 
 39. In Carson Case, DOJ Agrees ‘Foreign Official’ Knowledge is Required, 
THE FCPA BLOG (Sept. 27, 2011, 1:28 AM), 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2011/9/27/in-carson-case-doj-agrees-foreign-
official-knowledge-is-requ.html; see United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 
1108 (C.D. Cal. 2011); see also Aluminum Bahrain B.S.C. v. Alcoa Inc., No. 8–
299, 2012 WL 2094029 (W.D. Pa. June 11, 2012); United States v. Carson et 
al., No. SA CR 09-00077-JVS, 2011 WL 5101701, at *2–5 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 
2011) (employees of state-owned companies may fall within the FCPA’s 
meaning of “foreign official;” instrumentalities of foreign governments may 
include entities that are not departments or agencies of a foreign government 
and a categorical exclusion of state-owned companies may be improper). 
 40. United States v. Kozeny, 493 F. Supp. 2d 693, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (cit-
ing Xia Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 326 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. (citing Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 713 n.13 (2000)). 
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American judicial interpretation of “foreign official,”43 can pro-
vide guidance in the creation of an as-yet unsolidified definition 
of the term “foreign official” within the FCPA.44 
Part I of this Note will propose three analytical lenses 
through which one may examine anti-corruption legislation. 
Part II will use those lenses to survey comparative anti-bribery 
measures developed by the Organization for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (“OECD”) Convention on Combat-
ing Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Busi-
ness Transactions (“Convention”) and also the United King-
dom. Part III will then focus those lenses on the FCPA itself, 
exploring its history and judicial interpretation. Part IV will 
examine the specific matter of “foreign official” in light of the 
general discussion of anti-corruption legislation and consider a 
definition using the three analytical lenses offered at the be-
ginning of this Note. 
I. THREE ANALYTICAL LENSES FOR DEFINING “FOREIGN 
OFFICIAL” 
The following three analytical models may provide direction 
as to the intended meaning of “foreign official”: the Charming 
Betsy Doctrine;45 the level playing field argument;46 and the 
public trust doctrine, which includes both the traditional and 
corporate proconsul variations.47 Each proposed model will be 
described in turn. 
A. The Charming Betsy Doctrine: Complying with International 
Norms 
In 1804, the court in Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy 
held that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to 
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction re-
mains.”48 That concept has become known as the Charming 
Betsy Doctrine.49 The Charming Betsy Doctrine has had a last-
ing impact on legislation, and compliance with international 
                                                                                                             
 43. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1117. 
 44. See id. 
 45. See infra Part I.A. 
 46. See infra Part I.B. 
 47. See infra Part I.C. 
 48. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 117–18, 2 
L.ED. 208 (1804). 
 49. See, e.g., Aguilar, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1116. 
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norms was an important factor behind the implementation of 
the FCPA.50 The need and desire to align with the views of the 
international community influenced the anti-corruption legisla-
tion in the United Kingdom, as well.51 Thus, examining inter-
national definitions of “foreign official,” and the motivations 
behind the specific wording of said definitions in light of the 
Charming Betsy Doctrine, could help clarify the definition with-
in the American legislation. 
B. The Level Playing Field Approach: Promoting Fair Competi-
tion 
Considering the motivating effect that compliance with in-
ternational norms had on drafting the American and British 
anti-corruption legislation, reviewing the goals of the OECD 
Convention could help direct our understanding of the FCPA 
and the U.K. Act and, specifically, their respective uses of the 
term “foreign official.”52 The OECD is an independent organiza-
tion that serves to “promote policies that will improve the eco-
nomic and social well-being of people around the world.”53 The 
ideas motivating the OECD in general, and the OECD Conven-
tion, provide another analytical lens: the level playing field. 
One major goal of the OECD Convention was to “level [the] 
playing field,”54 or, in other words, to promote fair competi-
tion.55 This popular concept deals with the competitiveness of 
markets that have been compromised by corruption.56 Applying 
the level playing field concept to the U.K. and U.S. legislation, 
and to their respective definitions of “foreign official,” could 
therefore provide another route to clarification. 
                                                                                                             
 50. Nicholas Cropp, The Bribery Act vs. the FCPA: Nuance vs. Nous, [2011] 
CRIM. L.R. 122, 125–126 (2011). 
 51. See id. at 126. 
 52. See Cohen, supra note 37, at 1259–60. For a more extensive discussion 
of the OECD and its goals, see infra Part II.A. 
 53. About the OECD, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT [OECD], 
http://www.oecd.org/about/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2012). 
 54. Cropp, supra note 50, at 125. 
 55. Id. at 123. 
 56. Id. at 124–25. 
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C. The Public Trust Doctrines 
1. Public Trust: The Traditional View 
Some international organizations view corruption in terms of 
the public trust doctrine. In their view, the public grants cer-
tain individuals positions of power, and when those individuals 
corruptly exploit those positions, it is a breach of public trust.57 
For example, the OECD Convention defines corruption as the 
“abuse of public or private office for personal gain.”58 Similarly, 
Transparency International is an international coalition 
against corruption that “work[s] cooperatively with all individ-
uals and groups, with for-profit and not-for-profit corporations 
and organisations, and with governments and international 
bodies committed to the fight against corruption.”59 It defines 
corruption as “behaviour on the part of officials in the public 
sector, whether politicians or civil servants, in which [those of-
ficials] improperly and unlawfully enrich themselves, or those 
close to them, by the misuse of the public power entrusted to 
them.”60 
2. Public Trust: The Corporate Proconsul View61 
The “corporate responsibility” or corporate proconsul model is 
a variant of the public trust model and can elucidate the defini-
tion of “foreign official,” as well.62 This model has a similar con-
cept to the traditional public trust model—that a duty is owed 
to the public at large stemming from the entity’s place of power 
                                                                                                             
 57. OECD, CORRUPTION: A GLOSSARY OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS 2 
(2007) [hereinafter OECD, GLOSSARY]. 
 58. Id. at 19. 
 59. Who We Are, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, 
http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/mission_vision_and_val
ues (last visited Aug. 26, 2012). 
 60. OECD, GLOSSARY, supra note 57, at 20. 
 61. In The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, George Greanias and Duane 
Windsor contemplate corporations as being the holders of public trust. They 
discuss the idea of “the corporation as government proconsul.” This concept 
accounts for what the authors perceived as a “major change in government 
intervention in the private sector . . . from government action to achieve eco-
nomic ends to government action intended to reach various social goals.” 
GEORGE C. GREANIAS & DUANE WINDSOR, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES 
ACT: ANATOMY OF A STATUTE 46 (1982). 
 62. See id. at 44 (explaining the possible quasi-political role of corpora-
tions). 
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and trust within society63—only here the entity in that place of 
power and trust is a corporation rather than a public official.64 
The corporation, “by virtue of the financial, human, and natu-
ral resources that it commands, by the great wealth which it 
accumulates and expends, and by its ability to affect even those 
not directly affiliated with the enterprise, has power that is not 
merely economic but also social and political,”65 and therefore is 
afforded public trust. Importantly, this corporate accountability 
concept is distinct from that of legal corporate responsibility.66 
Corporate accountability, 
is rooted in the concept that corporations have been granted a 
franchise or license by society that is in the nature of a privi-
lege. Continuation of that franchise requires an accounting of 
the corporation’s relationship with and contribution to socie-
ty. The franchise comes with terms and conditions; thus the 
corporate community must hold itself accountable to society 
beyond legal compliance with statutes and regulations. Ac-
countability extends to corporate power, corporate perfor-
mance, and corrupt behavior. Legal compliance and ethical 
behavior are expected.67 
Because the public places its trust in the corporation, corporate 
corruption and bribery violates that trust.68 Though neither 
iteration of the public trust doctrine defines “foreign official” 
per se, both may still provide valuable insight into the way 
many international actors approach the term. 
II. COMPARATIVE LEGISLATION 
Studying foreign anti-corruption legislation, in addition to 
policy proposals from international organizations, is a con-
structive exercise when analyzing vague domestic legislation 
such as definitional language within the FCPA. Doing so in 
this case is not only important for application of the Charming 
Betsy Doctrine, but it also helps to generally survey the anti-
corruption landscape. The OECD Convention and the U. K. Act 
                                                                                                             
 63. Id. at 44, 46. 
 64. Id. at 46. 
 65. Id. at 44. 
 66. See id. at 35–36. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 45–46. 
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provide useful comparative legislation for the FCPA and also 
working definitions of the term “foreign official.” 
A. OECD Convention 
The mission of the OECD is to promote equal economic foot-
ing for all countries through fair, multilateral trade and compe-
tition.69 The OECD Convention was adopted in November 1997, 
entered into force in February 1999, and as of April 2012, thir-
ty-four OECD member countries and five non-member coun-
tries had signed onto it.70 The Convention “establishes legally 
binding standards to criminalise bribery of foreign public offi-
cials in international business transactions and provides for a 
host of related measures that make this effective.”71 
Generally, the OECD subscribes to the level playing field or 
fair competition model of validating anti-corruption legislation: 
Pursuant to Article 1 of the Convention signed in Paris on 
14th December 1960, and which came into force on 30th Sep-
tember 1961, the [OECD] shall promote policies designed: 
to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth 
and employment and a rising standard of living in 
Member countries, while maintaining financial stabil-
ity, and thus to contribute to the development of the 
world economy; 
to contribute to sound economic expansion in Member 
as well as non-member countries in the process of 
economic development; and 
to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a 
multilateral, non-discriminatory basis in accordance 
with international obligations.72 
However, the OECD has also faced outside pressure to adopt 
the fair competition approach. “[The] diplomatic pressure ex-
erted by the United States on other nations to level the playing 
field internationally, was arguably a key factor in the creation 
of the 1997 OECD Convention, which in turn resulted in 
                                                                                                             
 69. OECD, GLOSSARY, supra note 57, at 2. 
 70. Id. at 19; Anti-Bribery Convention, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/daf/ 
briberyininternationalbusiness (last visited Oct. 21, 2012). 
 71. OECD, OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1. 
 72. OECD, GLOSSARY, supra note 57, at 2. 
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FCPA-like legislation in numerous signatory nations,” includ-
ing the United Kingdom.73 Moreover, the fact that the OECD 
strives to “accord[] with international obligations” suggests 
that the same motivations behind the Charming Betsy Doctrine 
were also at play during the drafting of the OECD convention.74 
B. The U.K. Act 
The U.K. Act75 criminalizes the bribery of government offi-
cials, both domestic and foreign; commercial bribery; the ac-
ceptance of bribes; and the failure of a corporation to prevent 
the offering of bribes.76 Furthermore, the statutory language 
encompasses several types of entities,77 including firms incor-
porated in the United Kingdom, those that have a business—or 
any part of a business—within the United Kingdom, and any 
person that is “associated” with such corporations.78 The stat-
ute defines an “associated” person as anyone that acts on be-
half of the corporation.79   
Although the U.K. Act is progressive in many respects, in-
cluding its provision imposing strict liability on firms failing to 
prevent bribery, it also affords corporations some defenses.80 To 
offer one important example, a corporation under investigation 
may escape liability by providing proof that it composed, dili-
gently implemented, and informed employees and associates of 
adequate anti-bribery compliance rules.81 
1. The U.K. Act and Charming Betsy 
The Charming Betsy Doctrine, though a feature of U.S. law, 
represents an approach to enacting and interpreting a nation’s 
domestic legislation that played a crucial role in creating the 
U.K. Act. The OECD Convention put forth standards for anti-
corruption legislation and made recommendations for the Unit-
                                                                                                             
 73. Cropp, supra note 50, at 125. 
 74. OECD, GLOSSARY, supra note 57, at 2. 
 75. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23 (2010) (Eng.) [hereinafter U.K. Act]. The U.K. 
Act was passed on March 30, 2011 and entered into force on July 1, 2011. 
Borg, supra note 25, at 1; Jordan, supra note 18, at 864. 
 76. U.K. Act, c. 23. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Jordan, supra note 18, at 865–66. 
 79. Id. 
 80. U.K. Act, c. 23. 
 81. Jordan, supra note 18, at 866. 
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ed Kingdom to bring itself into immediate compliance with 
those standards in 2003, 2005, and 2007.82 In October 2008, the 
OECD indicated, in its report on a British bribery case,83 that it 
was “disappointed and seriously concerned with the unsatisfac-
tory implementation of the Convention by the UK.”84 Such crit-
icism by the OECD, in which other international organizations 
and even other countries joined, likely influenced the U.K.’s 
decision to reform its anti-bribery legislation,85 though the ex-
planatory notes to the U.K. Act suggest that it was written in 
response to the country’s self-realization that existing anti-
corruption laws were outdated, convoluted, and “in need of re-
form.”86 
                                                                                                             
 82. OECD, United Kingdom: Phase 2bis: Report on the Application of the 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery 
in International Business Transactions, at 5 (Oct. 16, 2008) [hereinafter 
OECD, Phase 2bis]; OECD, Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Conven-
tion: Report on the United Kingdom 2007, at 89 (July 17, 2006) [hereinafter 
OECD, Implementing]; see also Tim Pope & Thomas Webb, The Bribery Act 
2010, 25(10) J. INT’L. BANKING L. & REG. 480, 480 (2010). 
 83. In 2004, the United Kingdom’s Serious Fraud Office (“SFO”) began an 
investigation into alleged bribery by BAE Systems PLC, a British exporter of 
military aircraft, in relation to a contract with Saudi Arabia for Al-Yamamah 
aircraft. See The Queen on the Application of Corner House Research and 
others v. Director of the Serious Fraud Office, [2008] UKHL 60, (appeal taken 
from [2008] EWHC (Admin) 246). The SFO halted the investigation in 2006 
prompting the criticism by the OECD. See id. In 2008, the Divisional Court 
found that the SFO’s discontinuation of the investigation into BAE Systems 
was unlawful. See id. The House of Lords overturned that decision on appeal, 
deciding that the Director of the SFO acted properly in taking into account 
threats made against the British public if the investigation continued, re-
gardless of whether it was in violation of Article 5 of the OECD Convention. 
See id. 
 84. OECD, Phase 2bis, supra note 82, at 4; Pope, supra note 82, at 481. 
 85. Id. at 123 (“In reality, external pressures and concerted international 
criticisms of the UK’s existing approach to corruption may have had greater 
impact on the genesis of the Act than is suggested.”). 
 86. Cropp, supra note 50, at 122.  
Explanatory Notes suggest that reform was needed because “the law 
in the United Kingdom was ‘old and anachronistic’ and that ‘[f]rom a 
purely legal perspective, the case for reform is a compelling one.’” 
[quoting Jack Straw MP] This language suggests that the 2010 Act 
originated with an internal realization that the U.K.’s antiquated 
bribery laws were in need of reform. The explanatory notes quote the 
Law Commission’s November 2008 Report, “Reforming Bribery,” in 
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In addition to the OECD’s influence, the United States also 
may have impacted the United Kingdom’s decision to revise its 
anti-corruption legislation.87 The U.S. National Security Strat-
egy identifies the fight against corruption as an integral part of 
its mission to protect human rights and to stimulate develop-
ment and security around the world.88 Transparency and ac-
countability with regard to the finances of governments and 
their public officials are important parts of such anti-
corruption effort.89 The United States, in seeking to expand its 
security policies and to maintain competitive advantages for 
citizens engaging in foreign business, has exerted pressure on 
the United Kingdom to bring its own anti-corruption legislation 
up to international norms.90 
The language in provisions of the U.K. Act itself is also indic-
ative of the United Kingdom’s reaction to international pres-
sure to reform its anti-corruption legislation.91 For example, 
                                                                                                             
which the Commission similarly notes that “the current law is rid-
dled with uncertainty and in need of rationalization.” 
Id. 
 87. Id. at 125. 
Indeed the disadvantage occasioned to US corporations by the com-
pliance requirements of the FCPA, and subsequent diplomatic pres-
sure exerted by the United States on other nations to level the play-
ing field internationally, was arguably a key factor in the creation of 
the 1997 OECD Convention, which in turn resulted in FCPA-like 
legislation in numerous signatory nations. 
Id. The United States influenced the creation of the OECD Convention, which 
in turn influenced the United Kingdom to bring its anti-corruption legislation 
up to international norms. Id. See also, G. Sullivan, The Bribery Act 2010: 
Part I: an overview, 2 CRIM. L. REV. 87, 96–97 (2011) (U.K.). 
 88. Sullivan, supra note 87, at 96–97. 
 89. Id. (“Pervasive corruption is a violation of basic human rights and a 
severe impediment to development and global security. We will work with 
governments and civil society organisations to bring greater transparency 
and accountability to government budgets, expenditures and the assets of 
public officials.”) 
 90. Id. at 97 (“Obviously, the United States will want to pursue this in-
creasingly robust anti-corruption strategy at least cost to its competitive posi-
tion. One can anticipate various forms of encouragement from the United 
States for the United Kingdom to do its bit.”). 
 91. Id. at 94 (“Perhaps the most significant role for this new offence is to 
flag clearly that the United Kingdom is compliant with its treaty obligations 
to combat the bribery of public officials.”). 
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the U.K. Act makes it a distinct offense to bribe a foreign offi-
cial.92 This offense appears to be somewhat redundant, or even 
superfluous,93 considering that other provisions of the U.K. Act 
adequately prohibit bribery. It seems that including the dis-
tinct offense of bribing foreign officials is meant to placate the 
OECD by adopting similar language to that promulgated by 
the Convention, and to visibly demonstrate the United King-
dom’s effort to expeditiously improve upon its anti-corruption 
legislation.94 
2. The U.K. Act and the Level Playing Field Approach 
Through its anti-corruption legislation, the United Kingdom 
also seeks to level the playing field, but not solely for the sake 
of curbing unfair advantages.95 Bribery not only subverts the 
marketplace, but also diverts funds from public projects to cor-
rupt individuals.96 This results in a “human tragedy,” in which 
“power is abused[,] the weak are exploited[, and] the dishonest 
rewarded.”97 The U.K. Act aims to rectify that wrong and to 
right the imbalance of power.98 
                                                                                                             
 92. U.K. Act, c. 23, § 6(1)–(8); Sullivan, supra note 87, at 94. 
 93. See id. 
 94. Sullivan, supra note 87, at 94. In regards to the specific offense of brib-
ing a foreign official, 
There is reason to doubt whether this offence makes any substantive 
contribution to the criminalisation of bribery. Since 2001 UK corrup-
tion legislation has been given an extra-territorial dimension and it 
is difficult to envisage conduct falling within the new foreign public 
officials offence which would not also be covered by the two core 
bribery offences, subject to any jurisdictional constraints. Additional-
ly, where foreign officials are bribed on behalf of UK companies, the 
companies are very likely to be exposed to liability under the failure 
of a commercial organisation to prevent bribery offence, which has a 
very wide jurisdictional base. Perhaps the most significant role for 
this new offence is to flag clearly that the United Kingdom is compli-
ant with its treaty obligations to combat the bribery of public offi-
cials. 
Id. 
 95. Pope, supra note 82, at 480. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 98. See Cropp, supra note 50, at 124; see also Randal C. Archibald, Even as 
It Hurts Mexican Economy, Bribery is Taken in Stride, N.Y. TIMES, April 23, 
2012, at A4. 
430 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 38:1 
3. The U.K. Act and the Public Trust Doctrines 
Certain aspects of the U.K. Act also suggest that the drafters 
of that statute considered “public trust” to be an important con-
cept.99 The U.K. Act criminalizes conduct that induces a foreign 
public official to improperly perform a relevant function or ac-
tivity.100 When defining those relevant functions or activities, 
the U.K. Act provides that the function or activity meet one of 
three conditions, namely that the person performing the activi-
ty is expected to do so in good faith, is expected to perform it 
impartially, or is in a “position of trust by virtue of performing 
it.”101 The three preceding conditions are “relevant expecta-
tions” under the U.K. Act, and the official function is performed 
improperly only if the performance breaches one of those “rele-
vant expectations.”102 Section five of the Act provides a test to 
determine the impropriety of given conduct.103 Notably, that 
test is based on “what a reasonable person in the UK would ex-
pect in relation to the performance of the type of function or 
activity concerned.”104 By adopting a reasonableness standard 
that focuses only on the British perspective, this test disre-
gards the local custom and practice of the country in which the 
alleged action—i.e. bribery—may be taking place, unless that 
country permits or requires the action in question under its 
written law.105 
The U.K. Act also appears to be influenced by the idea of cor-
porate responsibility, or the corporate proconsul approach to 
the public trust doctrine. This is evidenced in large part by 
provisions that afford targeted companies defenses that hinge 
on the company’s ability to prove internal cultures of responsi-
bility. The Serious Frauds Office (“SFO”) “will expect to see not 
just paper-compliance, but rather an anti-corruption culture, 
‘fully and visibly supported at the highest levels’ in the commer-
cial organization.”106 Some proponents of the public trust doc-
trine argue that the U.K. Act should aim for a “behavioural 
                                                                                                             
 99. Sullivan, supra note 87, at 88. 
 100. U.K. Act, c. 23, § 4; David Aaronberg & Nichola Higgins, The Bribery 
Act 2010: All Bark and No Bite . . . ?, 2010 ARCHBOLD REV. 5, 6 (2010) (Eng.). 
 101. Aaronberg, supra note 100, at 2. 
 102. U.K. Act, c. 23, § 4(2); Aaronberg, supra note 100, at 7. 
 103. U.K. Act, c. 23, § 5. 
 104. Aaronberg, supra note 100, at 2. 
 105. Sullivan, supra note 87, at 91. 
 106. Aaronberg, supra note 100, at 6 (emphasis in original). 
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change” in corporate Britain such that “no form of corruption is 
tolerated.”107 
The United Kingdom’s implicit desire for corporate responsi-
bility is clear, both from the fact that it is much easier to prose-
cute companies under the bribery statutes108 and from the fact 
that the U.K. Act provides an adequate procedures exception.109 
Lord Bach, the former Minister for Legal Aid, indicated in a 
December 2009 letter to the House of Lords that, 
[i]t is not our intention to drag well run companies before the 
courts for every infraction. It would be wrong to leave organi-
zations open to a heavy fine if a rogue element within its 
ranks bribes on behalf of the organization when those who 
manage it can show they have put in place procedures de-
signed to prevent bribery on its behalf.110 
The availability of the adequate procedures defense illustrates 
that the United Kingdom is not simply interested in prosecut-
ing companies for violating the U.K. Act.111 Rather, it is more 
interested in encouraging companies to make meaningful 
changes to their corporate culture and to make fighting corrup-
tion a priority.112 Companies would be more inclined to formu-
late effective compliance programs if they knew it would help 
them avoid liability in the future.113 Indeed, the interplay be-
tween the “long-arm jurisdiction”114 and the adequate measures 
                                                                                                             
 107. Id. at 1. 
 108. Id. at 5, stating: 
Section 7 [of the U.K. Act] is intended to make it much simpler to 
prosecute such organizations for bribery offences. Previously prose-
cutors had to identify the directing will and mind within a company 
at the time an offence was committed and obtain evidence of that 
person’s knowledge and involvement. Unsurprisingly, there were few 
prosecutions. Under the new Act, prosecutors will need only to prove 
fault by an individual connected to a relevant organization—”A”—in 
order to engage this section. 
Id.; see also U.K. Act, c. 23, § 7. 
 109. Aaronberg, supra note 100, at 5. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 1, 8. 
 113. See id. at 8. 
 114. The U.K. Act employs “long-arm jurisdiction” because, “nationals [and] 
closely connected persons of the regulated country, including companies in-
corporated in the regulated country, can be prosecuted regardless of where 
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defense strikes “an appropriate balance between the need to 
aggressively police corrupt activities in foreign jurisdictions 
and the need to protect corporations which have committed re-
sources to establishing principles-based policies, procedures 
and controls, notwithstanding the nefarious acts of the corpora-
tion’s employees or agents.”115 
III. THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 
A. History 
Congress enacted the FCPA in 1977 following a confluence of 
events—the Watergate scandal, an SEC investigation, and a 
voluntary bribery disclosure program—that exposed the fact 
that American companies had been making millions of dollars 
in bribes to foreign officials.116 Congress responded to these 
findings by amending the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 
which resulted in the creation of the FCPA.117 
The FCPA has two provisions: the anti-bribery prohibitions 
and specific accounting requirements.118 The anti-bribery pro-
visions addressed the corrupt practices by which American 
businesses obtained business abroad, which frequently consist-
ed of outright bribes to government officials or the payment of 
fees to “consultants” who then acted as intermediaries to facili-
tate bribes.119 The accounting provisions addressed the accom-
panying “slush funds, off-book accounts and other financial 
practices,” which served to conceal the corruption.120 
The FCPA prohibits corruptly paying a foreign official money 
or anything of value, either directly or indirectly, for certain 
purposes.121 Those purposes include attempting to influence 
any official act or decision, inducing the official to commit an 
                                                                                                             
the corrupt activity took place around the world.” Cropp, supra note 50, at 
136. 
 115. Cropp, supra note 50, at 136. 
 116. GREANIAS, supra note 61, at 1–3; McSorley, supra note 23, at 749–50; 
Cortney C. Thomas, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Decade of 
Rapid Expansion Explained, Defended, and Justified, 29 REV. LITIG. 439, 442 
(Winter 2010). 
 117. McSorley, supra note 23, at 749–50. 
 118. Low, supra note 19, at 718. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. FCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a) (1998). 
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unlawful action, or trying to secure an improper business ad-
vantage.122 
As noted in the Introduction of this Note, “foreign official” 
under the FCPA is, 
any officer or employee of a foreign government or any de-
partment, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public 
international organization, or any person acting in an official 
capacity for or on behalf of any such government or depart-
ment, agency, or instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any 
such public international organization.123 
Judicial interpretation of “foreign official” is almost nonexist-
ent. The court in Aguilar notes only that the FCPA does not 
define instrumentality and the court in Aluminum Bahrain 
B.S.C. v. Alcoa Inc. reserved judgment on whether or not em-
ployees of a holding company owned by the government of Bah-
rain were “foreign officials” in terms of the FCPA.124  
1. The FCPA and the Charming Betsy Doctrine 
International pressure has had an impact on the creation of 
the FCPA similar to that which influenced the U.K. Act.125 The 
United States Congress adopted the FCPA, and incorporated it 
into the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,126 following the 
Watergate scandal.127 One main purpose of the FCPA was to 
repair international perception of the American democracy af-
ter it had faltered.128 International views on anti-corruption, 
and OECD policies in particular, also influenced specific provi-
sions of the FCPA during the amendment processes, which oc-
                                                                                                             
 122. Id. 
 123. FCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(2)(A) (1998). 
 124. United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1112 (C.D. Cal. 2011); 
Aluminum Bahrain B.S.C. v. Alcoa Inc., 2012 WL 2094029 at *3 (W.D. Pa. 
June 11, 2012). 
 125. Cropp, supra note 50, at 125. 
 126. STUART H. DEMING, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND THE NEW 
INTERNATIONAL NORMS v, xvii (2d ed. 2010); Cropp, supra note 50, at 125. 
 127. The Watergate scandal unearthed “myriad illegal contributions to 
President Nixon’s reelection campaign and corporate slush funds used to 
bribe foreign officials and police.” Stephen A. Fraser, Placing The Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act on The Tracks in The Race For Amnesty, 90 TEX. L. REV. 
1009, 1010 (2012). 
 128. DEMING, supra note 126, at xvii, 3; Cropp, supra note 50, at 125 n.13. 
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curred in 1988 and 1998.129 For example, the United States im-
plemented the OECD suggestions through the 1998 amend-
ments by extending the jurisdiction under the FCPA to include 
considerations of the nationality of the perpetrators.130 The 
1998 Amendments also expanded the FCPA to allow prosecu-
tion of “any person” that commits bribery, whether or not the 
entity they work for was also prosecuted, where before only 
corporate persons—not individuals—had been held liable.131 
The amendments indicate that not only was the United States 
conscious of its image abroad when it originally drafted the 
FCPA, but it also continued to make an effort to conform with 
international norms when it drafted the two rounds of amend-
ments in 1988 and 1998.132 
2. The FCPA and the Level Playing Field Approach 
Given the United States’ pressure on the OECD and other 
countries to adopt the level playing field approach, it follows 
that one could read the FCPA, and thus define “foreign offi-
cial,” in light of that same concept of fair competition.133 In 
United States v. Kay, although not specifically addressing the 
issue of defining “foreign official,” the Fifth Circuit subscribed 
to the view that Congress intended generally for the FCPA to 
promote fairness in competition.134 The Kay court considered 
whether the illegal gain of tax reductions fell within the pro-
scription of bribes that secure business abroad.135 The court 
held that any payment to a foreign official that reduces a com-
pany’s costs—even if simply by reductions in customs duties 
and other taxes—indirectly benefits the company and affords 
an unfair advantage over its competitors in violation of the 
FCPA.136 
                                                                                                             
 129. DEMING, supra note 126, at 3; Cropp, supra 50, at 125 n.18. 
 130. DEMING, supra note 126, at 7. Jurisdiction now depends only on 
whether or not the person has status as an American citizen or national, or 
whether an entity is subject to U.S. laws either by incorporation or because 
its principal place of business is situated in the United States. Id. at 7–8. 
 131. Cropp, supra note 50, at 125. 
 132. DEMING, supra note 126, at xvii, 3, 7–8; see Cropp, supra note 50, at 
125. 
 133. Cropp, supra note 50, at 125. 
 134. See United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Kay 
I]. 
 135. Id. at 747–48. 
 136. Id. at 749, 756. 
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3. The FCPA and the Public Trust Doctrines 
Not only does the international community view corruption 
as an issue of public trust, but American judicial interpretation 
of the FCPA also does the same.137 The court’s treatment of the 
word “corruptly” in the FCPA is indicative of a traditional pub-
lic trust model of analysis.138 The Second Circuit noted the sim-
ilar usage of the word “corruptly” in the FCPA and in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 201, pertaining to bribery of public officials and witnesses.139 
In Stichting Ter Behartiging Van de Belangen Van Ou-
daandeelhouders In Het Kapitaal Van Saybolt Int’l B.V. v. 
Schreiber, the Second Circuit noted that, due to these similari-
ties, Congress probably intended to incorporate the elements of 
domestic bribery within the FCPA.140 Addressing bribery, the 
court stated that it had “repeatedly held in [the 18 U.S.C. § 
201] context that ‘a fundamental component of a ‘corrupt’ act is 
                                                                                                             
Avoiding or lowering taxes reduces operating costs and thus increas-
es profit margins, thereby freeing up funds that the business is oth-
erwise legally obligated to expend. And this, in turn, enables it to 
take any number of actions to the disadvantage of competitors. Brib-
ing foreign officials to lower taxes and customs duties certainly can 
provide an unfair advantage over competitors and thereby be of as-
sistance to the payor in obtaining or retaining business. 
Id. at 749. 
 137. See Stichting Ter Behartiging Van de Belangen Van Oudaandeelhoud-
ers In Het Kapitaal Van Saybolt Int’l B.V. v. Schreiber, 327 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 
2003) [hereinafter Schreiber]; see also United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432 
(5th Cir. 2007) [hereinafter Kay II]. 
 138. See Schreiber, 327 F.3d at 174. 
 139. Schreiber, 327 F.3d at 182–83. 18 U.S.C. § 201 refers to the Bribery of 
Public Officials and Witnesses. Subsection (b) provides in pertinent part that 
whoever, 
(1) directly or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers or promises anything 
of value to any public official or person who has been selected to be a 
public official, or offers or promises any public official or any person 
who has been selected to be a public official to give anything of value 
to any other person or entity, with intent— (A) to influence any offi-
cial act . . . shall be fined under this title or not more than three 
times the monetary equivalent of the thing of value, whichever is 
greater, or imprisoned for not more than fifteen years, or both, and 
may be disqualified from holding any office of honor, trust, or profit 
under the United States. 
18 U.S.C. § 201 (emphasis added). 
 140. Schreiber, 327 F.3d at 182–83. 
436 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 38:1 
a breach of some official duty owed to the government or the 
public at large.’”141 The Second Circuit had elaborated previous-
ly on the concept of a breach of trust in United States v. 
Rooney, reporting that “‘[b]ribery in essence is an attempt to 
influence another to disregard his duty while continuing to ap-
pear devoted to it or to repay trust with disloyalty.”142 In mak-
ing these findings, the court emphasized that it is the public 
who suffer when dishonest officials fail to serve them as they 
had been entrusted to do.143 
Beyond the interpretation of the word “corruptly,” American 
jurisprudence has also indicated that the FCPA as a whole is a 
statute about public trust.144 In United States v. Kay, the Fifth 
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision to enhance the de-
fendant’s sentence for violating the FCPA. The court predicated 
this enhancement upon the United States Sentencing Guide-
lines, which specifically allow for increased punishment if the 
defendant abused a position of trust.145 Until this decision, no 
court had decided whether the FCPA qualified as a violation of 
public trust deserving of a sentencing enhancement. The Fifth 
Circuit held that violation of the FCPA, like embezzlement or 
fraud, did indeed warrant a sentencing enhancement for abuse 
of public trust.146 
The FCPA can also be analyzed in light of the corporate pro-
consul variation of the public trust doctrine. This version of the 
public trust doctrine developed as the American corporate envi-
ronment shifted from focusing solely on profitability to also 
considering social responsibility.147 This shift led to the “idea of 
the corporation as a means for implementing public policy. 
[The] idea of the business enterprise as government procon-
sul,”148 and the FCPA was an example of the federal govern-
ment using the corporation as a proconsul in foreign affairs.149 
The concept of the corporation as a government proconsul ar-
guably developed because, “[the] American government [had] 
                                                                                                             
 141. Id. at 182. 
 142. United States v. Rooney, 37 F.3d 847, 852 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 143. Id. 
 144. See United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 460 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 145. Kay II, at 460; U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, 18 U.S.C. 
 146. Kay II, at 460. 
 147. GREANIAS, supra note 61, at 39. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
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come to realize . . . that enormous economic power is the power 
to affect society at large.”150 In the United States, the bulk of 
economic power has been organized in the corporate form.151 
“To effect major social change, it thus is argued, one must har-
ness [the] enormous potential [of this corporate form].”152 
Hence, American corporations became a leading force in re-
forms relating to racial and sexual discrimination, environmen-
tal protection, and equal employment.153 Likewise, the FCPA 
developed from this corporate proconsul concept, and “[i]n a 
sense . . . is an extension of the corporate-governance move-
ment.”154 Indeed, the FCPA’s implementation illustrated that 
“very little of the system that gave rise to the proconsular 
strategy ha[d] been dismantled.”155 Therefore, a corporate pro-
consular analysis of the term “foreign official” may help solidify 
a precise and more general working definition. 
B. Judicially Defining “Foreign Official” 
American courts have acknowledged the undefined nature of 
“foreign official” under the FCPA; however, they have only pro-
vided limited assistance in remedying the issue. In fact, this 
uncertainty has allowed for a broadening of the term “foreign 
official,” causing problems for American business.156 Because 
most cases settle before reaching trial,157 “judges have given 
little guidance as to what the FCPA’s bewildering text actually 
means. So, for now, it means whatever an aggressive prosecu-
tor says it does.”158 
In addition to those defendants that neatly fit the statutory 
definition, federal prosecutors have been identifying individu-
als employed by state-owned companies as “foreign officials.”159 
Doing so has made it difficult for companies to assess when 
their activities may come under the purview of the FCPA, espe-
cially when operating in markets in which wholly and partially 
                                                                                                             
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 45. 
 155. Id. at 46. 
 156. Hilzenrath, Spot?, supra note 31. 
 157. Cohen, supra note 37, at 1245–46. 
 158. The Economist, supra note 16. 
 159. Hilzenrath, Spot?, supra note 31. 
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state-owned companies are common.160 This, in turn, adversely 
affects American companies looking to do business in foreign 
markets.161 Consequently, businesses have begun challenging 
the imprecision of “foreign official” in their defense of allega-
tions of FCPA violations. United States v. Aguilar and Alumi-
num Bahrain B.S.C. v. Alcoa Inc are two such cases. 
1. United States v. Aguilar 
The “foreign official” question surfaced in United States v. 
Aguilar, which was litigated in the Central District of Califor-
nia in 2011.162 Keith E. Lindsey,163 Steve K. Lee,164 and Lindsey 
Manufacturing Company165 (“the Lindsey Defendants”), were 
charged with conspiracy to violate the FCPA and with substan-
tive violations of the FCPA. In the same case, two Mexican citi-
zens, Enrique Aguilar166 and his wife Angela Aguilar167 (“the 
Aguilar Defendants”), faced the same charges, inter alia, as the 
Lindsey Defendants.168 The jury found the Lindsey Defendants 
and Angela Aguilar guilty of violating the FCPA, a first in the 
prosecutorial history of the FCPA since most defendants choose 
to settle before trial.169 The defense, however, fought for dis-
                                                                                                             
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1108–10 (C.D. Cal. 
2011). 
 163. Keith E. Lindsey was the President of Lindsey Manufacturing and as 
such, he “had ultimate authority over all of defendant Lindsey Manufactur-
ing’s operations.” Furthermore, Mr. Lindsey “also had a majority ownership 
interest in defendant Lindsey Manufacturing.” Id. at 1111. 
 164. Steve K. Lee was the Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of 
Lindsey Manufacturing, and as such, he controlled Lindsey Manufacturing’s 
finances. Id. 
 165. Lindsey Manufacturing Company, incorporated and headquartered in 
Azusa, California, is a privately held company that manufactures emergency 
restoration systems and other equipment for use by electrical utility compa-
nies. Additionally, “[m]any of defendant Lindsey Manufacturing’s clients 
were foreign, state-owned utilities, including [Comisión Federal de Electri-
cidad (“CFE”)].” Id. 
 166. Enrique Aguilar, a director of Grupo International, was hired by Lind-
sey Manufacturing to obtain contracts with CFE for them. Id. 
 167. Angela Aguilar was an officer and director of Grupo International and 
as such managed the company’s finances. Id. 
 168. Id. at 1109 n.1, 1111. 
 169. Lindsey Manufacturing Defendants Convicted On All Counts, WALL ST. 
J., May 10, 2011, available at http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-
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missal170 of the indictment based on grounds of prosecutorial 
misconduct.171 The court granted the defense’s motion, threw 
out the convictions of the Lindsey Defendants, and dismissed 
the indictment.172 Although the indictment ultimately was 
dismissed, the court’s treatment of “foreign official” is still in-
formative as to one member of the judiciary’s view on the mat-
ter. 
The indictment stemmed from the bribery of two highly 
ranked officials, Nestor Moreno and Arturo Hernandez, of the 
Mexican utility company Comisión Federal de Electricidad 
(“CFE”),173 which is wholly state-owned.174 The Lindsey De-
fendants allegedly made payments to the Aguilar Defendants 
                                                                                                             
currents/2011/05/10/lindsey-manufacturing-defendants-convicted-on-all-
counts/tab/print/ [hereinafter WSJ, Lindsey]. Enrique Aguilar was not con-
victed, as he was a fugitive and therefore not on trial. Id. 
 170. The Government responded by filing the Government’s Response to the 
Defendants’ Supplemental Brief in Support of their Motion to Dismiss the 
Indictment with Prejudice Due to Alleged Repeated and Intentional Govern-
ment Misconduct on September 5, 2011. USA v. Noriega et al, 2:10CR01031. 
 171. As reported in the May 10, 2011 Wall Street Journal article, 
Jan L. Handzlik of Greenberg Traurig LLP, who represented Azusa, 
Calif.-based Lindsey, and its president, Keith Lindsey, said, “We are 
very disappointed by the jury’s verdict.” 
“We continue to believe in our clients’ innocence and will pursue our 
motion to dismiss the indictment on grounds of prosecutorial mis-
conduct,” said Handzlik. 
WSJ, Lindsey, supra note 169. 
 172. See United States v. Aguilar, 831 F.Supp.2d 1180, 1182 (C.D. Cal. 
2011). The court found that 
[t]he Government team allowed a key FBI agent to testify untruth-
fully before the grand jury, inserted material falsehoods into affida-
vits submitted to magistrate judges in support of applications for 
search warrants and seizure warrants, improperly reviewed e-mail 
communications between one Defendant and her lawyer, recklessly 
failed to comply with its discovery obligations, posed questions to 
certain witnesses in violation of the Court’s rulings, engaged in ques-
tionable behavior during closing argument and even made misrepre-
sentations to the Court. 
Id. 
 173. The Mexican Government owned CFE, an electric utility company that 
was responsible for supplying electricity to all of Mexico aside from Mexico 
City. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1109. 
 174. Id. 
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through the Aguilars’ company, Grupo International De Ase-
sores S.A. (“Grupo International”).175 The Aguilar Defendants 
then allegedly routed large portions of those payments to the 
CFE officers as bribes.176 According to prosecutors, 
[f]or a government official, Nestor Moreno lived pretty large. 
Moreno, the director of operations for Mexico’s nationalized 
electricity monopoly, drove a $297,000 Ferrari and owned a 
$1.8-million yacht named Dream Seeker. 
Moreno couldn’t afford these luxuries on his salary at the 
Federal Electricity Commission in Mexico City. Instead, U.S. 
prosecutors alleged, they were gifts from [Lindsey Manufac-
turing Company,] an Azusa company that was peddling its 
electricity transmission equipment to foreign buyers.177 
Before winning on their prosecutorial misconduct claim, the 
Lindsey and Aguilar Defendants originally moved to dismiss 
the indictment on the grounds that officers or employees of 
state-owned corporations should not be considered “foreign offi-
cials” under the FCPA, arguing that “under no circumstances 
can a state-owned corporation be a department, agency, or in-
strumentality of a foreign government.”178 However, the court 
rejected this argument, denied the motion to dismiss, and stat-
ed that CFE could be considered an “instrumentality” of the 
Mexican government and therefore come within the reach of 
the FCPA. Thus, Mr. Moreno and Mr. Hernandez found them-
selves within the folds of the FCPA as “foreign officials.”179 
The Aguilar court noted, however, that “[t]he FCPA does not 
define ‘instrumentality,’”180 and then undertook a discussion of 
what the word “instrumentality” may mean in terms of the 
FCPA.181 Both sets of defendants suggested that “instrumental-
                                                                                                             
 175. Grupo International was incorporated in Panama and headquartered 
in Mexico. Grupo International claimed to provide sales representation ser-
vices to companies doing business with CFE and would receive a percentage 
of the revenue that companies like Lindsey Manufacturing gained from their 
contracts with CFE. Id. at 1111. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Stuart Pfeifer, COURTS: Bribes to foreign firms are targeted, L.A. 
TIMES, March 11, 2011. 
 178. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1110. 
 179. Id. at 1119–20. 
 180. Id. at 1112 (emphasis in original). 
 181. Id. at 1113–20. 
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ity” should be interpreted in light of the two words preceding it 
in the statute: “agency” and “department.”182 In light of this 
preceding language, they asserted, “instrumentality” should 
only include entities that possess the characteristics that are 
common to both “agencies” and “departments.”183 The court en-
tertained this argument, although it did not ultimately agree 
with it,184 and proposed a “non-exclusive list”185 of the charac-
teristics that are consistent between agencies and depart-
ments: 
• The entity provides a service to the citizens—indeed, in 
many cases to all the inhabitants—of the jurisdiction. 
• The key officers and directors of the entity are, or are ap-
pointed by, government officials. 
• The entity is financed, at least in large measure, through 
governmental appropriations or through revenues obtained as 
a result of government-mandated taxes, licenses, fees or roy-
alties, such as entrance fees to a national park. 
• The entity is vested with and exercises exclusive or control-
ling power to administer its designated functions. 
• The entity is widely perceived and understood to be per-
forming official (i.e., governmental) functions.186 
The court continued the plain meaning analysis of “instru-
mentality” by considering how the FCPA uses the term, start-
ing with a review of the structure, objective, and policy of the 
FCPA as a whole.187 Having been defeated in their first effort, 
the defendants now argued that the FCPA focuses on only the 
bribery of governments and politicians and that this limitation 
was evident by Congress’ decision not to criminalize all foreign 
                                                                                                             
 182. Id. at 1114. 
 183. Id. 
 184. The Aguilar court disagreed with the defendants’ “all or nothing” view 
that “a state-owned corporation can never be an ‘instrumentality’ because 
state-owned corporations ‘do not always’ share the characteristics of depart-
ments or agencies.” The Court indicated that such a view is illogical as it fails 
to account for that which it “implicitly concedes,” namely, “that some state-
owned corporations can and do share the characteristics of departments and 
agencies.” Id. at 1115 (emphasis in original). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 1115–16. 
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bribery during the drafting and amending processes.188 The 
government countered that the FCPA should instead be con-
strued according to the Charming Betsy doctrine.189 
The court ultimately found the government’s Charming Betsy 
argument to be persuasive, focusing on the fact that the United 
States signed onto, and amended the FCPA in accordance with, 
the OECD Convention.190 The OECD Convention defined “for-
eign public official” to include “any person exercising a public 
function for a foreign country, including for a public agency or 
public enterprise . . . ,” and defines “public enterprise” as “any 
enterprise, regardless of its legal form, over which a govern-
ment, or governments, may, directly or indirectly, exercise a 
dominant influence.”191 After signing the OECD Convention, 
the United States amended the FCPA in 1998 to include the 
OECD language “public international organizations” in its def-
inition of “foreign official.”192 The defense in Aguilar found it 
notable, however, that whereas Congress had added “public 
international organizations” into its definition of “foreign offi-
cial” to conform with the OECD, it did not add “public enter-
prise” into the definition.193 
Both the government and the defense relied heavily on anal-
yses of the FCPA legislative history to determine what Con-
gress intended to fall within the meaning of “foreign official.”194 
The defense argued that not only did Congress fail to insert 
“public enterprise” during the 1998 Amendment process, but 
they had also declined to target bribes intended to influence 
state-owned corporations when faced with previous opportuni-
ties to do so.195 More specifically, “Congress rejected proposed 
bills that explicitly addressed payments to employees of state-
owned corporations.”196 The failure of proposed Senate Bill of 
August 6, 1976, which would have defined “foreign official” as 
“essentially, officers, employees or others acting on behalf of a 
                                                                                                             
 188. Id. at 1115. 
 189. Id. at 1116; Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 
117–18, 2 L.ED. 208 (1804). 
 190. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1117. 
 191. Id. at 1116 (citing OECD Convention, art. 1) (emphasis in original). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 1118. 
 194. Id. at 1117–19. 
 195. Id. at 1118. 
 196. Id. at 1117. 
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foreign government” and would have included state-owned cor-
porations in the meaning of “foreign government,”197 exempli-
fies one such rejection. Additionally, during a prior round of 
amendments to the FCPA in 1988, the amenders focused on 
“routine government action.”198 The Aguilar defendants 
claimed the “routine government action” focus in 1988 was fur-
ther evidence that Congress did not consider corporations to be 
included in that definition.199 Lastly, as previously mentioned, 
Congress had a chance in 1998 to explicitly include “public en-
terprise” when amending the FCPA following the OECD Con-
vention but did not do so.200 
The government addressed the FCPA legislative history by 
arguing that the FCPA’s failure to mention explicitly state-
owned companies did not mean that Congress meant to exclude 
them entirely.201 Further, the government maintained that 
when Congress uses a general term such as “instrumentality,” 
it necessarily includes the more specific examples within that, 
such as state-owned company or public enterprise.202 
Although the court acknowledged both sides of the legislative 
history debate, it ultimately held that, “the legislative history 
of the FCPA is inconclusive.”203 The court further stated that, 
“[a]lthough it does not demonstrate that Congress intended to 
include all state-owned corporations within the ambit of the 
FCPA, neither does it provide support for Defendants’ insist-
ence that Congress intended to exclude all such corporations 
from the ambit of the FCPA.”204 The court’s refusal to clarify 
the meaning of “foreign official” by issuing such vague and in-
conclusive language resulted in a continued—if not height-
ened—confusion regarding the meaning of the term, and a de-
finitive definition remains elusive. 
                                                                                                             
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 1118 (emphasis omitted). 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 1118–19. 
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 204. Id.; see also Aluminum Bahrain B.S.C. v. Alcoa Inc, 2012 WL 2094029, 
at *3 (W.D. Pa. June 11, 2012) (holding that the question of whether employ-
ees of a state-owned holding company are “foreign officials” within the mean-
ing of the FCPA is an issue of fact for the jury). 
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2. Aluminum Bahrain B.S.C. v. Alcoa Inc. 
The Western District of Pennsylvania addressed the “foreign 
official” question in June 2012 in Aluminum Bahrain B.S.C. v. 
Alcoa Inc.205 Aluminum Bahrain (“Alba”), a holding company 
owned by the government of Bahrain, alleged various fraud, 
conspiracy, and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Orgnaiza-
tions Act (“RICO”) claims against defendant William Rice.206 
These claims included an allegation that Rice was involved in 
illegal payments to foreign officials, and specifically alleged 
that “Bruce Hall, Zamil Al Joweiser and Yousif Shirawi, all ex-
ecutives and agents of Alba, received millions of dollars in 
bribes by virtue of their employment with Alba.”207 Rice moved 
to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim.208 The 
court denied Rice’s motion to dismiss.209 
The Alcoa court held, inter alia, that the status of employees 
of Alba as “foreign officials” was still a question of fact. The 
court’s leaving of the “foreign official” question to interpreta-
tion by the fact-finder means that the term is still undefined. It 
also suggests that the factors constituting a “foreign official” 
are case sensitive, rather than determinable as a matter of law. 
Thus, with the meaning of “foreign official” rendered a question 
of fact, the definition is open to even further broadening, the 
full breadth dependent on the determination of the fact-finder 
within the given case. Alcoa, like Aguilar, was one of the few 
instances where an FCPA case made it to trial rather than set-
tling,210 making it one of the few opportunities to define “for-
eign official” judicially. Like the earlier case, the Alcoa court’s 
decision to leave this question to the fact-finder created more 
uncertainty and prolonged the “foreign official” issue. 
The Eleventh Circuit will have an opportunity to assess the 
scope of “foreign official” in United States v. Esquenazi, in 
which the United States filed its appellate brief on August 21, 
2012.211 It will have a chance to review the legislative history of 
the FCPA and “any and all other sources” that may assist in 
                                                                                                             
 205. Alcoa, 2012 WL 2094029, at *1. 
 206. Id., at *1, *3. 
 207. Id. at *3. 
 208. Id. at *1. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Cohen, supra note 37, at 1245–46. 
 211. See Brief for the United States, United States v. Esquenazi, No. 11-
15331-C (11th Cir. Aug. 21, 2012), 2012 WL 3638390 at *1. 
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disambiguating the term “foreign official,” and, if circumstanc-
es demand, it could decide to apply the rule of lenity and con-
strue the definition in favor of the defendants.212 Using the fol-
lowing three lenses could be effective in helping the court un-
tangle the information, and perhaps nail down a definition of 
“foreign official.” 
IV. ANALYZING “FOREIGN OFFICIAL” UNDER THE THREE LENSES 
The Aguilar court posed a hypothetical as to whether the 
president of PEMEX is a “foreign official,” discussed at the be-
ginning of this Note.213 As was made apparent in Aguilar and 
Alcoa, the FCPA legislative history is inconclusive, and no level 
of the judiciary has really spoken on the matter of “foreign offi-
cial” either.214 Therefore, to reach an answer, or at least a pos-
sible path towards an answer, it may be instructive to view the 
particular concept of “foreign official” in the same manner in 
which this Note analyzed the OECD Convention, the U.K. Act, 
and the FCPA in general. The three proposed lenses—the 
Charming Betsy Doctrine, the Level Playing Field approach, 
and the Public Trust doctrines—may help refine the analysis 
and bring a definition of “foreign official” into focus. 
A. “Foreign Official” and the Charming Betsy Doctrine 
Since complying with international norms was one of Con-
gress’ motivating factors behind enacting and drafting the 
FCPA, one way to parse the statute’s definition of “foreign offi-
cial” would be to mirror those of the international community. 
Both the OECD and the United Kingdom subscribe to a defini-
tion of “foreign official” broader than strictly an officer or em-
ployee of a foreign government. The OECD Convention pro-
vides that a “foreign public official” is “any person holding a 
legislative, administrative or judicial office of a foreign country, 
whether appointed or elected; any person exercising a public 
function for a foreign country, including for a public agency or 
public enterprise; and any official or agent of a public interna-
tional organization.”215 The OECD Convention specifies that a 
                                                                                                             
 212. See United States v. Kozeny, 493 F. Supp. 2d 693, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 213. United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1119–20 (C.D. Cal. 
2011). 
 214. See supra Part III.B. 
 215. OECD, GLOSSARY, supra note 57, at 31. 
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“‘foreign country’ includes all levels and subdivisions of gov-
ernment, from national to local.”216 The U.K. Act also includes 
within the definition of “foreign public official”217 anyone that 
performs a public function “for any public agency or public en-
terprise of that country or territory (or subdivision of such 
country or territory.)”218 The “public enterprise” language in 
both the OECD Convention provision and the U.K. Act prohib-
its bribing employees or agents of state-owned corporations.219 
As noted, “foreign official” in the FCPA is still not as well de-
fined as it is under either the OECD Convention or the U.K. 
Act. The definition of “foreign official” in the FCPA was modi-
fied in 1998 to slightly mirror the language of the OECD Con-
vention definition by including “any official or employee of a 
public international organization or any individual or entity 
acting on behalf of a public international organization.”220 
However, there are still some uncertainties as to what exactly 
the definition of “foreign official” includes. Under the FCPA, 
[t]he term ‘foreign official’ means any officer or employee of a 
foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumen-
tality thereof, or of a public international organization, or any 
person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any 
such government or department, agency, or instrumentality, 
or for or on behalf of any such public international organiza-
tion. 221 
The use of the word “instrumentality” is ambiguous, as was 
discussed by the Aguilar court.222 The term is broad and can 
encompass persons that would not otherwise appear to be “for-
eign officials,” such as employees of companies owned in whole 
or in part by a state government.223 However, inclusion of state-
owned company employees is not specifically provided for with-
                                                                                                             
 216. Id. 
 217. The OECD Convention and the U.K. Bribery Act employ the term “for-
eign public official” while the FCPA uses the term “foreign official.” See 
OECD, GLOSSARY, supra note 57, at 31; U.K. Act, c. 23, § 6(5); 15 U.S.C. § 
78dd-1(f)(1). 
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 222. See United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1115–16 (C.D. Cal. 
2011). 
 223. Cropp, supra note 50, at 136. 
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in the act.224 If the U.S. Congress were to follow the Charming 
Betsy doctrine, then it would likely include public enterprises 
and agents thereof in its definition of “foreign official,” sweep-
ing employees of state-owned corporations into the reach of the 
FCPA. Though Congress had a chance to modify the FCPA in 
this manner but chose instead to leave it broadly defined, the 
court in Aguilar appears to follow the path charted by the 
OECD and the United Kingdom.225 Furthermore, the court in 
Aguilar noted that the FCPA does not define “instrumentality,” 
which in turn lends ambiguity to the definition of “foreign offi-
cial.”226 The court also indicated that using the FCPA’s legisla-
tive history to interpret the meanings of those terms is incon-
clusive and the court should instead construe the terms accord-
ing to the Charming Betsy doctrine.227 The court therefore was 
persuaded that the definition of foreign official should be exam-
ined with the lens provided by the OECD Convention.228 
International norms regarding the meaning of “foreign offi-
cial” would lend support to the United States’ decision to in-
clude persons working for corporations wholly owned or par-
tially owned by states in its own definition.229 Thus, if constru-
ing the PEMEX situation according to the Charming Betsy doc-
trine, looking to international sources such as the U.K. Act, 
then “foreign official” would be defined broadly and would in-
clude the president of PEMEX as a “foreign official.”230 Exxon 
would therefore be subject to prosecution under the FCPA.231 
B. “Foreign Official” and The Level Playing Field Approach 
To consider a definition of “foreign official” that levels the 
playing field, one could look to the Kay court for support. The 
Kay court’s view of anti-corruption legislation as a means to 
level the playing field in international markets is in line with 
the general value of fair competition that underlies the FCPA 
                                                                                                             
 224. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(1). 
 225. See id. at 1117. 
 226. Id. at 1112. 
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itself, the OECD Convention, and the U.K. Act.232 Applying this 
concept to the “foreign official” issue would likely result in a 
broad definition, since any kind of bribery, whether involving 
public officials or private persons, would create an unfair ad-
vantage.233 
Assessing the PEMEX hypothetical according to the level 
playing field doctrine reaches a similar conclusion. The level 
playing field approach aims to eradicate bribery of any kind in 
order to create a fair and competitive marketplace, so Exxon’s 
undue influence on PEMEX’s decision in awarding the contract 
would also be subject to prosecution under this analysis.234 
C. “Foreign Official” and the Public Trust Doctrines 
Superimposing the public trust concept on the definition of 
“foreign official” may not necessarily support a broad-based def-
inition.235 Although the OECD version of the public trust doc-
trine includes the abuse of private office,236 other adaptations, 
including that of the United States, seem to indicate that the 
doctrine would only pertain to public officials.237 However, the 
corporate proconsul variation of the doctrine does seem to sug-
                                                                                                             
 232. Id.; H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4–5 (1977), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/history/1977/houseprt-95-640.pdf 
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The payment of bribes to influence the acts or decisions of foreign of-
ficials, foreign political parties or candidates for foreign political of-
fice is unethical. It is counter to the moral expectations and values of 
the American public. But not only is it unethical, it is bad business 
as well. It erodes public confidence in the integrity of the free market 
system. It short-circuits the marketplace by directing business to 
those companies too inefficient to compete in terms of price, quality 
or service, or too lazy to engage in honest salesmanship, or too intent 
upon unloading marginal products. In short, it rewards corruption 
instead of efficiency and puts pressure on ethical enterprises to lower 
their standards or risk losing business. 
Id. 
 234. See id. 
 235. OECD, GLOSSARY, supra note 57, at 19, 20. 
 236. See id. at 19. 
 237. Id. at 19–20. 
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gest that a public trust definition of “foreign official” could be 
broader than originally contemplated.238 
In view of this alternate iteration of the public trust doctrine, 
the scope of “foreign official” under that analytical lens is ex-
panded.239 Whereas the traditional public trust doctrine might 
have limited “foreign officials” to individuals squarely in the 
public sphere, the corporate proconsul approach opens the door 
to liability of private individuals as well.240 If corporations can 
be guardians of public trust by virtue of being financial power-
houses, then it would be fair to include the associated individu-
als as a form of official encompassed by the FCPA.241 Therefore, 
adhering to the corporate proconsul adaptation of the public 
trust model rather than the conventional version would sup-
port instead a broader definition of “foreign official,” more like 
the scope of definitions sustained by the Charming Betsy and 
level playing field lenses. 
In sum, the traditional public trust doctrine would apparent-
ly prosecute the president of PEMEX only if he were clearly an 
official of the Mexican government, rather than the president 
of a corporation that happens to be state-owned.242 However, 
when the alternate version of the public trust doctrine—the 
corporate proconsul approach—is taken into consideration, this 
analytical model would conclude that Exxon’s actions were vio-
lative of the FCPA.243 
It is probably most prudent to define “foreign official” accord-
ing to the corporate proconsul variant of the public trust lens. 
Given the expanding influence of corporations, this view would 
likewise expand their accountability. Broadly defining “foreign 
official” in terms of public trust would satisfy the motivations 
of the other models as well. The “foreign officials” are trusted to 
serve the public dutifully, and it is possible that the public 
could intend for those trusted officials to serve in a way that 
would not offend international norms or unfairly skew the 
playing field. Furthermore, “resort[ing] to any and all other 
sources,” did not “still result in a tie,” so application of the rule 
of lenity would not be necessary and courts would not be re-
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quired to construe “foreign official” narrowly in favor of the de-
fendants.244 Therefore, using the public trust doctrine to identi-
fy who is a “foreign official” would satisfy the proponents of 
each analytical lens, while also adjusting to the modernizing 
world in which corporations are increasingly situated in posi-
tions of public trust. 
CONCLUSION 
Whichever lens Congress or the courts decide to use to exam-
ine the problem of defining “foreign official,” it will likely direct 
their focus to a broad definition encompassing certain private 
individuals in addition to government officials.245 As for the 
PEMEX hypothetical, Exxon will likely find itself in trouble no 
matter which way the court views “foreign official.” 
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OVER-DETENTION: ASYLUM-SEEKERS, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND PATH 
DEPENDENCY 
INTRODUCTION 
e have seen this problem before.1 We have examined the 
shocking case studies of asylum-seekers detained cate-
gorically and for prolonged periods of time before.2 We have 
watched the United States shirk their international legal com-
mitments to ensure the dignity and humanity of refugees be-
fore.3 Yet despite the ongoing outcry of non-governmental or-
ganizations (“NGOs”)4 and legal scholars,5 and despite recent 
attempts by the United States government to improve the im-
migration system,6 little has been done to adequately improve 
the plight of detained asylum-seekers desperate to avoid re-
moval to a country in which they are likely to face persecution.7 
                                                                                                             
 1. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Com-
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 7. Compare Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 6 (establish-
ing prosecutorial discretion policy), with Julia Preston, Obama Policy on De-
porting Used Unevenly, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2011, at A16 (alleging that de-
spite the factors to be considered in light of the prosecutorial discretion policy 
some groups see less benefits than others). 
W
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Against a backdrop of domestic concern—exacerbated by the 
attacks of 9/118—that immigration carries inherent risks, the 
United States has detained non-citizens of all types for a varie-
ty of reasons9 and pursuant to broad legal mandates.10 While 
there are admittedly some conditions under which detention 
can be a legitimate governmental function, many countries of-
ten subject entrants to detention that is “arbitrary” or “unnec-
essary” in violation of international human rights laws and 
norms.11 In the United States, the decision to categorically de-
tain asylum-seekers—despite the existence of potential solu-
tions in the international community, including successful 
                                                                                                             
 8. Kevin Sullivan & Mary Jordan, Foreword to A.B.A., supra note 2, at v. 
The horrific September 11, 2001 terror attacks on New York City 
and Washington, D.C. fundamentally changed the way our nation of 
immigrants views itself. Shameful episodes of anti-immigrant vio-
lence immediately after the attacks grabbed most of the headlines. 
But the more significant shift has played out more quietly in federal 
government offices where immigration policy is made. The United 
States government, acting on a new urgency to control immigration 
and American borders, has tightened an array of regulations that af-
fect how people from other countries may enter or live in the United 
States. 
Id. While the 9/11 terror attacks perhaps intensified this fear, the concern 
about the link between immigration and domestic terrorism may have begun 
much earlier. See, e.g., Robert D. McFadden, Immigration Hurts City, New 
Yorkers Say in Poll, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1993, at B4. 
 9. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFF.OF IMMIGR.STAT. ANN. REP., 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2010, at 1 (2011) [hereinafter 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS], available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/enforcement-ar-
2010.pdf (“Foreign nationals may be removable . . . for violations including 
failure to abide by the terms and conditions of admission or engaging in 
crimes such as violent crimes, document and benefit fraud, terrorist activity, 
and drug smuggling.”). While this Note will hone in upon the detention of 
refugees and asylum-seekers, it is important to remember that these groups 
are just a portion of the non-citizen population detained each year. See id. 
 10. E.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2012) (expedited removal and, thus, 
mandatory detention, for all aliens arriving without having gone through the 
proper immigration channels). 
 11. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees [UNHCR], Alternatives to Detention of 
Asylum Seekers and Refugees, ¶¶ 1–2, U.N. Doc. POLAS/2006/03 (Apr. 2006) 
(by Ophelia Field & Alice Edwards) [hereinafter Alternatives to Detention] 
(finding that many states presume detention for asylum-seekers despite con-
trary interpretations of international laws). 
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NGO pilot efforts which use individualized risk-analysis12 and 
“Alternatives to Detention”13 (“ATD”) programs—may amount 
to unnecessary or arbitrary detention that violates interna-
tional human rights law.14 The arbitrary and unnecessary na-
ture of these detentions may have a particularly egregious im-
pact on the class of asylum-seekers15 affected, where the depri-
                                                                                                             
 12. Risk analysis is used in this Note to mean an individualized determi-
nation of a detained asylum-seeker’s eligibility for parole or release to an Al-
ternatives to Detention program, which includes an assessment of that indi-
vidual determining identity, risk of flight, potential for posing danger to the 
community, or regarding any other justification for release. See SEEKING 
PROTECTION, supra note 4, at 72–73. 
 13. “Alternatives to detention” is a term of art meaning an “alternative 
means of increasing the appearance and compliance of individual asylum 
seekers with asylum procedures and of meeting other legitimate concerns 
which States have attempted to address . . . through recourse to detention.” 
Alternatives to Detention, supra note 11, at ¶ 4. They will be discussed in 
more depth throughout this Note. 
 14. See, e.g., UNHCR, Back to Basics: The Right to Liberty and Security of 
Person and ‘Alternatives to Detention’ of Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, Stateless 
Persons and Other Migrants, 51–87, U.N. Doc. PPLA/2011/01.Rev.1 (Apr. 
2011) (by Alice Edwards) [hereinafter Back to Basics]; Alternatives to Deten-
tion, supra note 11, at ¶¶  1–2 (presuming detention may violate international 
law). 
 15. A subtle distinction exists between a refugee and an asylum-seeker; 
the United States defines refugees as those seeking protection before they 
arrive in the country while asylum-seekers are seeking protection after arriv-
ing in the United States. DANIEL C. MARTIN, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
OFFICE OF IMMIGR. STAT. ANN. FLOW REP., REFUGEES AND ASYLEES: 2010, at 1, 
4 (2011). The Department of Homeland Security further separates affirma-
tive asylum-seekers, who apply for asylum at a port of entry or within one 
year of arrival in the United States, from defensive asylum-seekers, who file 
for asylum in order to avoid removal or those who are subject to expedited 
removal. Id. at 4. In contrast, international discourse distinguishes asylum-
seekers from refugees on the basis that asylum-seekers “are individuals who 
have sought international protection and whose claims for refugee status 
have not yet been determined,” that is, their cases are still pending. 2009 
UNHCR Stat. Y.B. 13, http://www.unhcr.org/4ce532ff9.html. The distinction 
is irrelevant for the purposes of this Note because the language within U.S. 
statutes grants authorization to seek asylum to the same non-citizens as 
those protected in the international definitions of “refugee.” Compare 8 
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2012) and 8 U.S.C. § 1101(42) (2012) with Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees [Refugee Convention], art. 1, July 28, 
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 and Protocol to the 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees [Protocol to Refugee Convention], Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. This Note will focus on defensive asylum-seekers 
who announce their intention to seek asylum at the port of entry to the Unit-
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vation of liberty can exacerbate the traumas that led to their 
flight from their country of origin in the first place.16 
The United States has recognized that the immigration sys-
tem needs work.17 In the detention context, the United States 
has identified the need to incorporate risk analysis tools18 and 
ATDs in order to improve the process.19 However, the steps the 
United States has taken to develop and implement these tools 
have significantly deviated from the recommendations of ex-
perts in the field20 and have failed thus far to bring the country 
                                                                                                             
ed States and are thus trying to escape expedited removal and mandatory 
detention. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2012). 
 16. VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, TESTING COMMUNITY SUPERVISION FOR THE 
INS: AN EVALUATION OF THE APPEARANCE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 1 (2000) [here-
inafter VERA], available at 
http://www.vera.org/download?file=615/finalreport.pdf (“[D]etaining every 
noncitizen is neither just nor humane. Many people in removal proceedings 
are fleeing persecution in their own countries . . . Detention is an ordeal they 
should be spared.”). 
 17. THE WHITE HOUSE, BUILDING A 21ST CENTURY IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 
(2011), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/immigration_bluepri
nt.pdf. 
 18. DORA SCHRIRO, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGR. AND CUST. 
ENFORCEMENT, IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
20–21 (2009), available at www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp/pdf/ice-
detention-rpt.pdf. Dr. Schriro’s report identified a need for a “validated risk 
assessment instrument specifically calibrated for the U.S. alien population. 
The tool should assess initial and ongoing suitability for participation [in 
ATDs].” Id. at 20. 
 19. Id. 
 20. LUTHERAN IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE SERVICE, UNLOCKING LIBERTY: A 
WAY FORWARD FOR U.S. IMMIGRATION DETENTION POLICY 21 (2011) [hereinaf-
ter UNLOCKING LIBERTY] available at http://lirs.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/05/RPTUNLOCKINGLIBERTY.pdf. Asylum experts 
relevant to this Note include international bodies, such as the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees and the Executive Committee of the High 
Commissioner’s Programme, and NGOs like Amnesty International, Human 
Rights First, Vera Institute of Justice, Lutheran Immigration and Refugee 
Service, and International Detention Coalition. See UNHCR, UNHCR’s Re-
vised Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Deten-
tion of Asylum-Seekers, (Feb. 26 1999), [hereinafter UNHCR Guide-
lines] available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3c2b3f844.html; Ex-
ecutive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Detention of Asy-
lum-Seekers and Refugees: The Framework, the Problem and Recommended 
Practice, UNHCR, U.N. Doc. EC/49/SC/CRP.13 (Jun. 4 1999) [hereinafter Ex-
Com on Detention]; Amnesty Int’l, Irregular Migrants and Asylum-Seekers: 
Alternatives to Immigration Detention, AI Index POL 33/001/2009 (April 1, 
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into compliance with international law.21 This Note argues that 
unless the United States incorporates the recommendations of 
asylum experts to use thorough risk-analysis in creating an in-
dividualized ATD program, it will be unlikely to reduce the un-
necessary or arbitrary detention of many asylum-seekers and 
will therefore be unable to meet the minimum human rights 
standards required under international law.22 
Part I of this Note looks at the current U.S. immigration de-
tention system and some of the now well-established failures of 
the asylum detention process preventing the country from con-
forming to international human rights laws and norms. Part II 
explores the rationales behind detention of asylum-seekers 
with an eye toward how risk-analysis and ATDs can improve 
the system. Part III analyzes the current momentum for reform 
of the system in the context of path dependency, the notion that 
the future of the system will be dependent upon—and con-
strained by—decisions made now,23 and addresses why it is es-
sential to implement the recommendations of asylum experts 
now. Part IV discusses how the United States, by ignoring the 
recommendations of asylum experts regarding risk-analysis 
and alternatives to detention, has continuously violated inter-
national law. Part V lists the additional policy benefits to the 
United States should it adopt the proposed changes of asylum 
experts. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Current Status of the Detention System 
Since its transition from the former Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service (“INS”) to its current home as a subset of the 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), the Immigration 
                                                                                                             
2009) [hereinafter Amnesty Int’l]; SEEKING PROTECTION, supra note 4; VERA, 
supra note 16; UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20; R. SAMPSON ET AL., THE 
INTERNATIONAL DETENTION COALITION, THERE ARE ALTERNATIVES: A HANDBOOK 
FOR PREVENTING UNNECESSARY IMMIGRATION DETENTION (2011) available at 
http://idcoalition.org/cap/handbook/. 
 21. Compare Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 6, with Pres-
ton, supra note 7. 
 22. E.g., ExCom on Detention, supra note 20; Alternatives to Detention, 
supra note 11. 
 23. Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 
332, 332 (1985). 
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and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) division has rapidly expand-
ed the scope of its detention power and the numerical capacity 
of individuals in detention.24 The United Nations has defined 
detention as “the deprivation of liberty in a confined place, such 
as a prison or purpose-built reception or holding centre. It is at 
the extreme end of the spectrum of deprivations of liberty . . . 
.”25 In the U.S. immigration context, the purview of detention 
includes “the authority . . . to detain aliens who may be subject 
to removal for violations of administrative immigration law.”26 
Throughout fiscal year 2010, ICE detained 363,064 non-
citizens.27 ICE now has bed-space to house 33,400 detainees 
daily and averages 33,330 detainees per day—a notable in-
crease from the daily average of 27,990 in 2007.28 As of 2009, 
asylum-seekers constituted about 1400 of these daily detainee 
totals.29 In addition to a budget of over $2 billion for its immi-
gration Detention and Removal Office (“DRO”), Congress gave 
DHS unsolicited additional funding to increase the total num-
ber of beds by 600, to 34,000 total, in fiscal year 2012.30 The 
                                                                                                             
 24. See SCHRIRO, supra note 18, at 2, 4. 
 25. Back to Basics, supra note 14, at 8. See also Michael Flynn, Immigra-
tion Detention and Proportionality, Global Detention Project, Working Paper 
No. 4, 7–9 (Feb. 2011), available at 
http://www.globaldetentionproject.org/fileadmin/publications/GDP_detention_
and_proportionality_workingpaper.pdf (“Coming up with a one-size-fits-all 
definition [of detention] is a challenging undertaking, especially when as-
sessing a phenomenon that can radically change shape from one country to 
the next.”); Holding Patterns: Can Advocacy Efforts to Reform Migration De-
tention Inadvertently Lead to the Growth of Detention Regimes?, OPEN 
SOCIETY INSTITUTE, 34:00–38:40 (March 28, 2012), 
http://c482907.r7.cf2.rackcdn.com/migration-detention-20120328.mp3 [here-
inafter Holding Patterns] (discussing different definitions of detention). 
 26. SCHRIRO, supra note 18, at 4. 
 27. IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS, supra note 9, at 4. This statistic 
includes all categories of non-citizens, not just asylum-seekers. Id. 
 28. Fact Sheet: Detention Management, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT [ICE], http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/detention-
mgmt.htm (last accessed June 22, 2012). ICE notes that these numbers do 
not include counts for non-citizens detained with the Mexican Interior Repat-
riation Program or the Office of Refugee Resettlement. Id. 
 29. SCHRIRO, supra note 18, at 11. 11,244 people were granted affirmative 
asylum in fiscal year 2010, with the highest percentage of those coming from 
China. MARTIN, supra note 15, at 5. This follows a general decreasing trend 
in grants of asylum over the past several years. Id. 
 30. H.R. REP. NO. 112-91, at 52 (2011); NATIONAL IMMIGRATION FORUM, THE 
MATH OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION: RUNAWAY COSTS FOR IMMIGRATION 
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amount of available bed space may affect the amount of time 
an individual is detained.31 The average time of detention for 
asylum-seekers is controversial; some experts say it ranges 
from 47 to 109 days, while others indicate that it might be 
much longer.32 
Within the U.S. system, detention often consists of placement 
in county jails or commercialized detention centers.33 While 
this Note does not explore human rights violations or im-
provements extant within the detention system beyond its ar-
bitrary or unnecessary overuse, it is worthy of mention that 
extensive scholarship explores issues involving the general 
criminalization of the civil immigration system;34 the effects of 
                                                                                                             
DETENTION DO NOT ADD UP TO SENSIBLE POLICIES 2 (2012), available at 
http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/MathofImmigrationDetent
ion.pdf. 
 31. Michelle Brané & Christiana Lundholm, Human Rights Behind Bars: 
Advancing the Rights of Immigration Detainees in the United States Through 
Human Rights Frameworks, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 147, 157 (2008). 
 32. Renewing America’s Commitment to the Refugee Convention: The Refu-
gee Protection Act of 2010: Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 
(2010) (statement for the record from Physicians for Human Rights), availa-
ble at http://rcusa.org/uploads/pdfs/PHR%20Testimony,%205-19-10.pdf; 
UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 12. The U.S. Supreme Court case 
Zadvydas v. Davis, which declared detentions of more than six months to be 
unreasonable and at odds with the U.S. Constitution, does not protect asy-
lum-seekers because it only addressed the detention of those who were de-
tained while awaiting deportation, as opposed to awaiting asylum proceed-
ings. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
 33. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Organization of Ameri-
can States, Report on Immigration in the United States: Detention and Due 
Process, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, doc.78/10, 85–87 (2010) [hereinafter IACHR]. As of 
2009, approximately 50% of all detainees were held in county jails that also 
contained prisoners. SCHRIRO, supra note 18, at 10. 
With only a few exceptions, the facilities that ICE uses to detain al-
iens were built, and operate, as jails and prisons to confine pre-trial 
and sentenced felons. ICE relies primarily on correctional incarcera-
tion standards designed for pre-trial felons and on correctional prin-
ciples of care, custody, and control. These standards impose more re-
strictions and carry more costs than are necessary to effectively 
manage the majority of the detained population. 
Id. at 2–3. 
 34. See generally Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42 (2010). Criminal and immigrant populations in 
detention are treated essentially the same. SCHRIRO, supra note 18, at 4. 
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family and child detention;35 and the lack of adequate medical 
care,36 access to legal representation,37 and workable civil 
standards for detention.38   
B. The Process for Detaining Asylum-Seekers in the United 
States 
Currently, non-citizens entering the United States without 
legally having gone through the proper immigration process in 
advance are automatically placed in expedited removal pro-
ceedings unless they express their desire to apply for asylum to 
an immigration officer.39 Once they do so, an immigration of-
ficer will detain the asylum-seeker pending the filing of their 
asylum application and an interview with an asylum officer.40 
From this point forward, the asylum-seeker is subject to man-
datory detention, unless and until they can establish a basis for 
discretionary parole or they are deported.41 
After filing for asylum, the detainee proceeds to what is re-
ferred to as a “credible fear hearing” or “credible fear inter-
                                                                                                             
 35. Alternatives to Detention, supra note 11, at ¶¶ 58-62. 
 36. See generally Riddhi Mukhopadhyay, Death in Detention: Medical and 
Mental Health Consequences of Indefinite Detention of Immigrants in the 
United States, 7 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 693 (2009). 
 37. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, JAILS AND JUMPSUITS: TRANSFORMING THE U.S. 
IMMIGRATION DETENTION SYSTEM–A TWO-YEAR REVIEW, 30 (2011) [hereinafter 
JAILS AND JUMPSUITS], available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-
content/uploads/pdf/HRF-Jails-and-Jumpsuits-report.pdf. 
 38. SCHRIRO, supra note 18, at 4 (“ICE adopted standards that are based 
upon corrections law and promulgated by correctional organizations to guide 
the operation of jails and prisons.”). 
 39. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii)(2012). Some exceptions do exist to bar an 
arriving alien from applying for asylum in the United States. Notably, he or 
she cannot have come from a safe third country where he or she could have 
sought asylum; additionally, subject to extenuating circumstances, he or she 
cannot have waited more than a year to apply for asylum after arriving in the 
United States or have had a previous unsuccessful asylum application. 8 
U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A). 
 40. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). While both are members of ICE, asylum 
officers are distinct from immigration officers in that they have “professional 
training in country conditions, asylum law, and interview techniques compa-
rable to that provided to full-time adjudicators of [asylum] applications” and 
that more experienced asylum officers supervise them. 8 U.S.C. § 
1225(b)(1)(E). 
 41. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii); IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS, supra 
note 9, at 2. Parole will be discussed in more depth below. 
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view,”42 which may take place up to forty-five days after the 
filing of an application for asylum.43 At the hearing, one seek-
ing asylum must establish to the satisfaction of an asylum of-
ficer that he or she has a “credible fear of persecution” in his or 
her home country.44 This fear is defined as “a significant possi-
bility, taking into account the credibility of the statements 
made by the alien in support of the alien’s claim and other such 
facts as are known to the officer, that the alien could establish 
eligibility for asylum” under existing U.S. law.45 At a credible 
fear hearing, an ICE officer has the sole ability to determine if 
the asylum-seeker has a credible fear that will likely support a 
future favorable asylum ruling by an immigration judge.46 This 
is the first, but not only, opportunity for individual discretion 
or arbitrariness to seep into the asylum process.47 If the deter-
mination of the asylum officer is unfavorable, the asylum-
seeker will be slated for expedited removal “without further 
hearing or review.”48 If favorable, the asylum officer will refer 
the asylum-seeker for asylum adjudication in front of an immi-
gration judge.49 By statute, the entire proceeding, excluding 
appeal, should be concluded within 180 days, although the 
                                                                                                             
 42. E.g., Brané & Lunholm, supra note 31, at 150. 
 43. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(5)(A)(ii)(2012). 
 44. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). 
 45. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v). Authority for asylum itself is based on 8 
U.S.C. § 1158. The United States limits the available categories of persecu-
tion for which one can claim asylum to “race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) 
(2012). 
 46. Gwynne Skinner, International Law Weekend 2009-I: Bringing Inter-
national Law to Bear on the Detention of Refugees in the United States, 16 
WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISPUTE RES. 270, 275 n.18 (2008). Other than a 
lack of credible fear, factors that might lead to rejection of a claim at this 
point may include “committing certain crimes, posing a national security 
threat, engaging in the persecution of others, or firmly resettling in another 
country before coming to the United States.” MARTIN, supra note 15, at 4. 
 47. ExCom on Detention, supra note 20, at 3 (stating that discretion leads 
to arbitrariness). For a criticism of the United States’ ability to determine 
credibility as being arbitrary in relation to refugee determinations, see An-
drew F. Moore, Unsafe in America: A Review of the U.S.-Canada Safe Third 
Country Agreement, 47 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 201, 237–238 (2007). 
 48. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I). If the asylum-seeker makes a “prompt” 
request, he or she may have the decision reviewed by an immigration judge, 
which by statute must happen no later than seven days after the negative 
credible fear determination. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III). 
 49. Skinner, supra note 46, at 275. 
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statute provides for the extension of this timeframe for “excep-
tional circumstances.”50 
As noted, prior to being granted asylum by an immigration 
judge, arriving asylum-seekers are subject to mandatory deten-
tion unless they can establish their basis for discretionary pa-
role.51 This presumption in favor of detention is codified in 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), which authorizes the Attorney General, 
in his discretion[, to] parole into the United States temporari-
ly under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-
by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant 
public benefit any alien applying for admission to the United 
States, but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as 
an admission of the alien and when the purposes of such pa-
role shall, in the opinion of the Attorney General, have been 
served the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the 
custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case 
shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of 
any other applicant for admission to the United States.52 
Thus, asylum-seekers will only be paroled if an individualized 
case analysis reveals there is an “urgent humanitarian reason” 
or “significant public benefit” for so doing. 53 This basis for pa-
role has also been defined as applying to those classes of aliens 
“whose continued detention is not in the public interest as de-
termined by [ICE officials].”54 In a policy shift effective early 
2010, ICE began to interpret parole in the “public interest” un-
der this section to require “that the alien’s identity is sufficient-
ly established, the alien poses neither a flight risk nor a danger 
                                                                                                             
 50. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(5)(A)(iii). 
 51. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(iii) (2012); Memoran-
dum from John Morton, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, to Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Parole of Arriving 
Aliens Found to Have a Credible Fear of Persecution or Torture, at 2 (Dec. 8, 
2009) [hereinafter Credible Fear Parole], available at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/pdf/11002.1-hd-
parole_of_arriving_aliens_found_credible_fear.pdf. 
 52. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)(2012). 
 53. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b)(5) (2012). Other classes enumerated under this sec-
tion are more readily eligible for parole because they do not include a discre-
tionary determination by an ICE official; these include individuals with seri-
ous medical conditions, pregnant women, juveniles, and those who are serv-
ing as witnesses in court proceedings. Id. 
 54. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). See also 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b); Credible Fear 
Parole, supra note 51, at 2, 6–8. 
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to the community, and no additional factors weigh against the 
release of the alien.”55 
While this development is a positive shift because it stream-
lined and increased the transparency of parole decisions, the 
proof requirements remain an especially weighty burden for 
asylum-seekers.56 Despite apparent sympathy to the circum-
stances of asylum-seekers, the policy emphasizes the discre-
tionary nature of parole and requires the asylum-seeker to bear 
the burden of demonstrating this information to the satisfac-
tion of an ICE officer.57 The policy standards themselves recog-
nize the inherent difficulties for asylum-seekers to provide ad-
equate documentation or produce credible witnesses to corrobo-
rate their claims on asylum matters.58 These difficulties may 
include a lack of travel documents, often associated with an 
asylum-seeker’s unwillingness or inability to contact their for-
                                                                                                             
 55. Credible Fear Parole, supra note 51, at 6. In 2011, Morton issued an 
additional directive, entitled Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent 
with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Ap-
prehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (“Exercising Prosecutorial Dis-
cretion”), which essentially incorporates the earlier memo and reiterates the 
discretion of ICE officers to grant parole to an asylum-seeker under specific 
circumstances. See Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 6. ICE is 
quick to add that the established policy creates no private cause of action. 
Credible Fear Parole, supra note 51, at 10. 
 56. IACHR, supra note 33, at 45–47. The international community has 
reviewed and commented on the general shift in ICE detention policy under 
the Obama Administration. See, e.g., id. On the positive side, asylum-seekers 
no longer have to file for parole; a parole meeting is automatic within seven 
days of an asylum officer determining that the asylum-seeker has a credible 
fear of persecution. Id. There are provisions to improve the transparency of 
the process both through increased documentation and through informing 
asylum-seekers about the process and their rights within it. Id. However, 
there are criticisms in the international community that these changes do not 
adequately address the problems for detainees, as they still bear a potentially 
“insurmountable” burden of proof on the identity, flight risk, and security 
issues. Id. Furthermore, because of the discretionary nature of the process, 
there is great potential for arbitrary denials of parole, and thus arbitrary 
detention; this arbitrariness is especially obvious when considering regional 
disparities in parole denials. Id. Additionally, negative parole determinations 
remain reviewable only at the discretion of an ICE officer, which enforces the 
officer’s role as both “judge and jailer.” IACHR, supra note 33, at 45–47. See 
also Kalhan, supra note 34, at 51. For the policy itself, see Exercising Prose-
cutorial Discretion, supra note 6. 
 57. Credible Fear Parole, supra note 51, at 6–8. 
 58. Id. 
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mer government, or a lack of ties to any community within the 
United States as a result of their recent urgent arrival.59 Asy-
lum-seekers are additionally prejudiced because, by virtue of 
their situation, any attempt to meet this proof requirement to 
gain parole must be done while in detention.60 Moreover, the 
same set of challenges, particularly the notion that “detention 
will often deprive the asylum-seeker of an opportunity to pre-
sent his or her [case] or to have the assistance of counsel,”61 
limit the asylum-seeker’s ability to successfully obtain parole.62 
Furthermore, because the policy standards are non-binding, 
they can be changed at any time and thus do not provide any 
lasting guarantees even for the opportunity of parole.63 As a 
result, the system remains weighted in favor of continued de-
tention.64 
C. How the U.S. Detention System Violates International Hu-
man Rights Laws and Norms 
Numerous legal scholars and advocacy groups have argued 
that the U.S. detention policy—featuring a presumption in fa-
                                                                                                             
 59. Id. 
 60. Mark L. Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to 
Appointed Counsel for Manditorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal 
Proceedings, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. (forthcoming 2012) (discussing how deten-
tion leads to “cascading deprivations” of rights of those detained—for exam-
ple, the difficulties in obtaining counsel from detention may lead to higher 
rates of unsuccessful cases and time wasted arguing over appointed counsel 
for detainees); Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Article 31 of the 1951 Convention Relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees: Non-Penalization, Detention, and Protection, in 
REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR’S GLOBAL 
CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, 185, 223 (Erika Feller et al. 
eds., 2003) (“Detention will often deprive the asylum-seeker of an opportunity 
to present his or her case.”); SAMPSON ET AL., supra note 20, at 50 (“social iso-
lation is a significant issue for most detainees.”). The parole determination 
“typically occurs within three weeks of apprehension.” UNLOCKING LIBERTY, 
supra note 20, at 20. 
 61. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 60, at 223. See also, Noferi, supra note 60, at 
25–26 (“The difficulty of challenging an immigration detention and case while 
detained is compounded by the inability of most detainees to secure counsel—
or, indeed, any adequate source of legal assistance.”). 
 62. See Goodwin-Gill, supra note 60, at 223; Noferi, supra note 60, at 25–
26. 
 63. IACHR, supra note 33, at 45–47; Kalhan, supra note 34, at 51. 
 64. See Credible Fear Parole, supra note 51, at 6–8. See also IACHR, supra 
note 33, at 45–47; Kalhan, supra note 34, at 51. 
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vor of detention—violates international obligations.65 Various 
treaties and conventions articulate an aversion to immigration 
detention in the vast majority of circumstances, finding it to be 
violative of human rights principles.66 This includes the more 
specific rules regarding asylum-seekers who declare their de-
sire to seek asylum once they are within the country to which 
they fled.67 “In most cases, only if an individual’s claim to refu-
gee status is examined before he or she is affected by an exer-
cise of State jurisdiction . . . can the State be sure that its in-
ternational obligations are met.”68 This pre-approval, however, 
may prove challenging for asylum-seekers to attain given that 
the persecution many of them are fleeing might not provide the 
time or opportunity to plan ahead and apply for protection in 
another country before leaving their home country.69 
The United States is not a party to all of such conventions or 
treaties,70 although it is arguably bound under customary in-
ternational laws71 or norms to abide by them anyway.72 Codifi-
                                                                                                             
 65. E.g., SEEKING PROTECTION, supra note 4; VERA, supra note 16, at 31–
32; UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, 5–6; Brané & Lundholm, supra note 
31. 
 66. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), art. 9 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR] (against 
arbitrary detention of all people); Refugee Convention, supra note 15; Proto-
col to Refugee Convention, supra note 15, art. 31(2); 1966 International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, arts. 9, 12 [hereinafter 
ICCPR] (against arbitrary and unnecessary detention). 
 67. See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 66; Refugee Convention, supra note 15; 
Protocol to Refugee Convention, supra note 15; ICCPR, supra note 66, arts. 9, 
12. 
 68. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 60, at 187 (emphasis in original). Here “State 
jurisdiction” indicates the country to which the asylum-seeker fled. See id. 
 69. See, e.g., Credible Fear Parole, supra note 51, at 6 (recognizing that 
arriving aliens might not have travel documents because of flight). 
 70. For example, the United States “remains the only state, other than 
Somalia, which has not ratified the [Convention on the Rights of the Child],” 
a convention essential for guaranteeing rights of children and families in asy-
lum and other contexts. Brané & Lundholm, supra note 31, at 153. 
 71. Customary international law is “international law that derives from 
the practice of states and is accepted by them as legally binding. This is one 
of the principal sources or building blocks of the international legal system.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 892 (9th ed. 2009). 
 72. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 111(1) (1987) (“Inter-
national law and international agreements of the United States are law of 
the United States and supreme over the law of the several States.”). See also 
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cation of customary international law declares that a country 
“violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it 
practices, encourages or condones . . . prolonged arbitrary de-
tention.”73 Admittedly, some international laws or norms have 
exigency exceptions that allow states to detain aliens in cases 
of “necessity.”74 However, as most of those detained do not pre-
sent any risks to the State from which they are seeking aid, 
these exigency exceptions do not justify the categorical deten-
tion of all asylum-seekers.75 
There are multiple international treaties that protect the 
rights of people seeking asylum, and many have prohibitions 
against “arbitrary” detention, “unnecessary” detention, or 
both.76 Beginning with the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (“UDHR”), the international community has recognized 
“the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from 
persecution.”77 Furthermore, the UDHR established that “no 
one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile.”78 
While establishing these rights that would come to form the 
basis of international human rights law, the drafters of the 
UDHR did not define many of the terms they used, including 
“arbitrary.”79 
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(“1951 Convention”) expanded upon the UDHR by creating a 
multilateral treaty wherein “the contracting states shall not 
apply to the movements of such refugees restrictions other 
                                                                                                             
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of 
our law.”). 
 73. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, § 702(e) (1987). 
 74. See, e.g., Refugee Convention, supra note 15, art. 31(2); Goodwin-Gill, 
supra note 60, at 232. 
 75. See Back to Basics, supra note 14, at 2 (“[L]ess than ten percent of asy-
lum applicants . . . disappear when they are released to proper supervision 
and facilities.”). 
 76. UDHR, supra note 66, art. 9 (against arbitrary detention); Refugee 
Convention, supra note 15; Protocol to Refugee Convention, supra note 15; 
ICCPR, supra note 66, at arts. 9, 12 (against arbitrary and unnecessary de-
tention). The two terms are interrelated, as detaining unnecessarily can con-
stitute arbitrariness. See, e.g. Brané & Lundholm, supra note 31, at 157. 
 77. UDHR, supra note 66, art. 14(1)(III). 
 78. Id. art. 9 (emphasis added). 
 79. See UDHR, supra note 66, art. 14(1)(III) (not defining terms used); The 
Foundation of International Human Rights Law, 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/hr_law.shtml (last accessed June 22, 
2012) (UDHR as basis for field of international human rights law). 
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than those which are necessary and such restrictions shall only 
be applied until their status in the country is regularized or 
they obtain admission into another country.”80 While detention 
for identity verification, public safety, and national security 
have been given as examples of detention that could potentially 
be considered “necessary,” and therefore permissible under the 
1951 Convention, some scholars have interpreted detention 
subsequent to these conditions to be only for extraordinary cir-
cumstances.81 While the United States did not sign the 1951 
Convention, it did ratify the 1967 Protocol to the 1951 Conven-
tion that incorporated and modernized the Convention, thereby 
binding the United States to those international obligations.82 
In addition to the 1951 Convention/1967 Protocol restrictions 
against unnecessary detention, the 1966 International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) prohibits deten-
tion from being “arbitrary.”83 Under Article 9 of the ICCPR, ar-
bitrary detention, though not precisely defined, is expressly 
prohibited.84 Article 9 further holds speedy access to a court 
proceeding to be essential for anyone “deprived of his liberty by 
. . . detention.”85 
Because much of the language in these treaties is vague or 
undefined, the international community seeks guidance from 
both the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(“UNHCR”) and the Executive Committee of the UNHCR (“Ex-
                                                                                                             
 80. Refugee Convention, supra note 15, art. 31(2) (emphasis added). 
 81. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 60, at 232. 
 82. Refugee Convention, supra note 15; Protocol to Refugee Convention, 
supra note 15. The United States signed the 1967 Protocol without any reser-
vations, understandings, or declarations (“RUDs”) relevant to this analysis. 
Protocol to Refugee Convention, supra note 15. 
 83. ICCPR, supra note 66, art. 9(1). The United States ratified the ICCPR 
in 1992, attaching RUDs that limit some provisions, but none specifically 
relevant to this analysis. Id. The United States declared the Convention to be 
non-self-executing, or incapable of taking effect without implementing legis-
lation. Id; Kessler, supra note 3, at 577; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1482 (9th 
ed. 2009) (defining self-executing). 
 84. ICCPR, supra note 66, art. 9(1); Kessler, supra note 3, at 580 (“In the 
context of Article 9(1), [arbitrary] encompasses not just unlawful detentions, 
but also all those that are unjust, unpredictable, unreasonable, capricious, 
and disproportional.”). 
 85. ICCPR, supra note 66, art. 9(4). 
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Com”) in interpreting its obligations to refugees.86 The ExCom 
has stated that 
[W]ide discretionary powers [to detain] . . . are far too fre-
quently applied in an arbitrary manner. For instance, a large 
number of asylum-seekers are detained on the formal basis 
that it is likely that they will abscond . . . international 
standards dictate that there must be some substantive basis 
for such a conclusion in the individual case.87 
The specious justification of needing to prove an asylum-
seeker’s identity is yet another example of arbitrariness in the 
detention process.88 Proving identity “should not routinely be 
judged necessary” in light of the circumstances which lead asy-
lum-seekers to flee persecution in the first place.89 The ExCom 
guidelines emphasize that implementing individualized, 
“prompt, mandatory and periodic review of all detention orders 
before an independent and impartial body” of the destination-
state’s need to detain is fundamental to avoiding arbitrary de-
tention.90 Furthermore, the UNHCR has continually advocated 
for a presumption against detention.91 
Scholars have additionally argued that arbitrary detention 
exists where there is “inappropriateness, injustice, and lack of 
predictability” in the detention process.92 “Arbitrary detention 
occurs when refugee applicants are detained on the basis of 
broad criteria that do not allow for individualized determina-
                                                                                                             
 86. See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 n.22 (1987). The 
United States Supreme Court has held that at least one set of guidelines es-
tablished by the UNHCR is helpful in interpreting 1967 Protocol obligations. 
Id. In discussing the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining 
Refugee Status, written by the UNHCR, the Court said, “the Handbook pro-
vides significant guidance in construing the Protocol, to which Congress 
sought to conform. It has been widely considered useful in giving content to 
the obligations that the Protocol establishes.” Id. The Court noted that the 
guidance, while helpful, was non-binding. Id. See also, Skinner, supra note 
46, at 278–79. 
 87. ExCom on Detention, supra note 20, at 3. 
 88. Id. at 4. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 3–4. 
 91. UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 20, at 3; UNHCR, Detention of Refu-
gees and Asylum-Seekers,  U.N. Doc. 44 (XXXVII) – 1986 (Oct. 13, 1986); Ex-
Com on Detention, supra note 20, at 1. 
 92. Brané & Lundholm, supra note 31, at 156–57 (quoting GUY GOODWIN-
GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 305 (2d ed. 1996)). 
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tions of the need for detention, when there is no administrative 
or judicial review, or when detention occurs for disproportion-
ate or extended periods.”93 
U.S. practices are arbitrary because detention is applied as a 
“blanket policy;” chances for parole—varying “anywhere from 
0.5% to 98%”—are inconsistent;94 judicial review, in practice, is 
either unavailable or limited by judges citing a lack of jurisdic-
tion; and because compliance rates are quite high, further sup-
porting “the argument that the detention of asylum seekers is 
arbitrary because it is unnecessary.”95 Moreover, there is evi-
dence to suggest arbitrariness in parole decisions, as some 
watchdog groups have found that the choice to parole an asy-
lum-seeker can sometimes be made based on available bed 
space in detention centers rather than the merits of an individ-
ual’s claim for release.96 As put forth in the Restatement Third, 
“[A] single, brief, arbitrary detention by an official of a state 
party to one of the principal international agreements might 
violate that agreement; arbitrary detention violates customary 
law if it is prolonged and practiced as state policy.”97 This 
weighs against the United States’ categorical detention of all 
asylum-seekers because, without sufficient individualized as-
sessment, there is no way to ensure detention is necessary.98 
Additionally, because the U.S. policy leaves determinations of 
credible fear and parole to the discretion of individual ICE of-
ficers, any localized breach or non-compliance can result in in-
ternational law violations.99  
The international community has noticed the United States’ 
violations of international law.100 Following his May 2007 visit, 
the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights of Migrants ex-
pressed his “serious concern” with the status of the U.S. deten-
                                                                                                             
 93. Moore, supra note 47, at 267. 
 94. Brané & Lundholm, supra note 31, at 157 (“[Parole policy] seems to 
depend more upon the personality of the district director and the available 
bed space than it does upon a reasoned policy of release criteria.”). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Moore, supra note 47, at 263, 269. 
 97. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 702 cmt. h (1987). 
 98. See Goodwin-Gill, supra note 60, at 219. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See, e.g., Special Rapporteur on Human Rights of Migrants, Mission to 
the United States of America, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/12/Add.2 (Mar. 5, 2008) (by 
Jorge Bustamante) [hereinafter Mission to the United States]; IACHR, supra 
note 33, at 144. 
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tion system.101 The Special Rapporteur “[came] to the conclu-
sion that the United States ha[d] failed to adhere to its inter-
national obligations to make the human rights of the 37.5 mil-
lion migrants living in the country . . . a national priority, using 
a comprehensive and coordinated national policy based on clear 
international obligations.”102 His report went on to discuss the 
various violations of international law within the United 
States103 and made recommendations for improvement that in-
cluded the complete elimination of mandatory detention.104 
Similarly, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
produced in 2011 a comprehensive report on the U.S. immigra-
tion and detention system.105 Along with urging the United 
States to “comply fully with the international human rights ob-
ligations under the American Declaration [of the Rights and 
Duties of Man],”106 the Commission advocated for the country’s 
discontinuation of mandatory detention practices.107 
II. DISASSOCIATING FROM PRESUMPTIONS THAT FAVOR 
DETENTION 
In order to become compliant with international law, the U.S. 
detention practices for refugees and asylum-seekers need to 
align more closely with the protection-based mandates of the 
aforementioned provisions that proscribe detention from being 
either arbitrary or unnecessary.108 To do this, the United States 
needs to utilize risk-analysis and ATDs to release or parole de-
tainees held without legitimate justification.109 However, no 
alternative program can be successful until the U.S. immigra-
tion system shifts its application of immigration statutes from 
                                                                                                             
 101. Mission to the United States, supra note 100, at 2. 
 102. Id. at 3. 
 103. See generally id. 
 104. Id. at 24. 
 105. IACHR, supra note 33. 
 106. Id. at 155. In its reply to the draft version of the report, the United 
States was quick to point out that the American Declaration is “a nonbinding 
instrument that does not itself create legal rights or impose legal obligations 
on signatory states.” Id. at 7. The IACHR countered that the Declaration does 
create obligations for member and non-member states alike under the charter 
of the Organization of American States, the American regional counterpart to 
the United Nations, of which the United States is a member. Id. at 10. 
 107. Id. at 147. 
 108. See Part I.B., supra. 
 109. See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l, supra note 20, at 16. 
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the categorical mandatory detention of asylum-seekers to a 
more flexible system where detention is used only as a last re-
sort.110 Many asylum experts have advocated for this and have 
created programs based on the “presumption against deten-
tion” model.111 To understand how, by following suit, the Unit-
ed States could avoid arbitrary or unnecessary detention, it is 
first helpful to recognize the rationales it puts forth for using a 
mandatory detention policy in the first place.112 Section A 
enunciates what risks the United States assumes when, rather 
than detain, it releases asylum-seekers into an ATD program 
and, by extension, the community. Sections B and C seek to 
understand the potential benefits of effectively implemented 
risk analysis and ATD programs as compared to those current-
ly in operation within the U.S. system. 
A. Detention Rationales 
Countries often cite the inherent risks associated with admit-
ting aliens as a rationale for detaining them.113 As discussed in 
Part I.B, the current U.S. detention policy centers on these 
risks by presuming detention for aliens unless they are able to 
establish: 1) their identity, 2) that they are not a flight risk 
and, 3) that they are not a danger to society; or they must es-
tablish they have an additional extenuating circumstance that 
justifies their release.114 By exploring the scope of these inher-
ent risks, the United States can better address any actual risks 
and ultimately eliminate the use of detention that is excessive 
in matching the scope of that risk.115 
The United States justifies detention—at least until there is 
satisfactory proof of the asylum-seeker’s identity—by citing the 
need to ensure that the alien will comply with specific proceed-
ings, including meeting attendance, hearings, and, potentially, 
                                                                                                             
 110. See, e.g., JAILS AND JUMPSUITS, supra note 37, at 42. 
 111. See, e.g., SAMPSON ET AL., supra note 20. 
 112. See Brané & Lundholm, supra note 31, at 149–52 (exploring detention 
rationales). 
 113. See id. 
 114. Credible Fear Parole, supra note 51, at 2–3, 6–8. Extenuating circum-
stances include serious medical conditions, pregnancy, juvenile status, and 
aliens slated to serve as witnesses. 8 C.F.R § 212.5(b); Credible Fear Parole, 
supra note 51, at 2. 
 115. See Brané, supra note 31, at 149–52. 
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removal.116 The United States has declared, “asylum-related 
fraud is of genuine concern”117 and also wants to be certain be-
fore paroling an asylum-seeker that the person is not threaten-
ing to the community or the nation as a whole.118 Further, the 
current policy indicates that detention will continue if there are 
“serious adverse foreign policy consequences that may result if 
the alien is released or [if there are] overriding law enforce-
ment interests.”119 Moreover, the U.S. immigration system is 
bogged down120 and the caseload in immigration courts is high, 
increasing the time that asylum-seekers in detention must wait 
for their case to be heard.121 
Yet if the U.S. method of detention is meant to serve as a de-
terrence to emigration, the strategy itself would violate inter-
national laws.122 Regardless of a host country’s detention poli-
cies, asylum-seekers will always impose some level of risk to 
that country.123 Thus, to argue that U.S. asylum detention is an 
                                                                                                             
 116. Credible Fear Parole, supra note 51, at 6 (“likelihood of appearing 
when required”) (emphasis added). 
 117. Id. at 7. 
 118. Id. at 8. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See, e.g., Michael Matza, Immigration Cases Clogging Federal Courts, 
PHILA. INQUIRER, July 18, 2011, at A2 (“Despite the nationwide hiring of more 
than 40 additional [immigration court] judges in the past year, the number of 
deportation cases, asylum claims, and green-card fraud prosecutions … is at 
an all time high: 275,000 and climbing.”); Dan Moffett, Conveyor Belt to De-
portation: Asylum Cases don’t get Attention they Deserve, PALM BEACH POST, 
Feb. 16, 2010, at A14 (“the system is choked by an exploding caseload and an 
exponential increase in outside pressures…the backlog has gotten progres-
sively worse in the last decade.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 121. See, e.g., Lenni B. Benson & Russell R. Walker, Enhancing Quality 
and Timeliness in Immigration Removal Adjudication, Report for the Admin-
istrative Conference for the United States, June 7, 2012, 40–42, available at 
http://www.acus.gov/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/06/Enhancing-
Quality-and-Timeliness-in-Immigration-Removal-Adjudication-Final-June-
72012.pdf (suggesting that defensive asylum cases should be heard by asylum 
officers like affirmative cases are, rather than immigration judges, in order to 
speed the process). 
 122. Refugee Convention, supra note 15, at art. 31(2); Protocol to Refugee 
Convention, supra note 15 (incorporating the articles of the Refugee Conven-
tion); See Alternatives to Detention, supra note 11, at 228 (noting the fear that 
deterrence is the true rationale behind U.S. detention and parole policies). 
 123. Back to Basics, supra note 14, at 1. “Any reduction in global asylum 
numbers have been associated with non-entrée policies, including contain-
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effective deterrence factor is to ignore the reason that people 
are seeking asylum in the first place: they consider the situa-
tion they are fleeing to be worse.124 Risk-analysis tools and 
ATDs can work together to ameliorate the concerns that justify 
detention, and reduce the burden on the U.S. immigration sys-
tem, by allowing for the parole of more asylum-seekers.125 
B. The Importance of Risk-Analysis 
To address these limited, but admittedly legitimate, fears 
and still comply with international obligations, the United 
States needs to assess the level of risk that asylum-seekers 
pose on an individual level, regarding both danger to society 
and risk of flight.126 Risk-analysis tools fill the gap between 
categorical detention and ATDs by ensuring that any method 
used for a person is necessary and not arbitrary, thus comply-
ing with international treaties.127 Detention can be legitimate 
under international law only when an individualized assess-
ment establishes that there is no lesser method that the gov-
ernment can take to mitigate the dangers posed by that partic-
ular non-citizen.128 This is because 
international human rights law requires that detention deci-
sions be made on a case-by-case basis after an individualized 
assessment of the functional and legitimate need of detaining 
a particular individual, the understanding that anyone de-
prived of liberty is entitled to judicial review of this decision, 
                                                                                                             
ment in regions of origin and interception/interdiction measures, or can be 
attributed to large-scale repatriation programmes.” Id. at 1 n.4. 
 124. Back to Basics, supra note 14, at 2 (“[T]hreats to life or freedom in 
countries of origin are likely to be a greater push factor than any disincentive 
created by detention policies in countries of destination.”). “The principal aim 
of asylum seekers and refugees is to reach a place of safety . . . those who are 
aware of the prospect of detention before arrival believe it is an unavoidable 
part of the journey, that they will still be treated humanely despite being 
detained.” SAMPSON, supra note 20, at 11. 
 125. SAMPSON, supra note 20, at 22. 
 126. SCHRIRO, supra note 18, at 17, 20. While this Note focuses on risk-
analysis as the capacity to reduce threats posed to the community, the as-
sessments can also include screening for special vulnerabilities present in the 
individual that require attention. SAMPSON, supra note 20, at 22. 
 127. UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 15. 
 128. See, e.g., ExCom on Detention, supra note 20, at 3 (noting that arbitrar-
iness results unless there is an individualized determination that a person is 
likely to abscond). 
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and that any restriction of liberty should be the least restric-
tive means necessary.129 
An appropriate risk assessment tool would allow the United 
States to screen for the identified threats posed by non-citizens 
entering the country—lack of identity, risk of flight, and risk of 
danger—in order to make decisions about the level of supervi-
sion and support necessary to ensure compliance with the sys-
tem.130 Such a tool could allow the United States to increase 
legitimacy within the system through increased compliance 
while reducing detention costs in favor of less-costly ATDs.131 
One criticism of the efficacy of any risk-assessment procedure 
is that there is a general absence of data at either the national 
or the international level regarding the success or failure of 
asylum-seekers to comply with proceedings or mandates.132 
“The scarcity of governmental statistics with regard to those 
who abscond [or fail to comply with a removal order] severely 
weakens the empirical evaluation of one form of conditional re-
lease in comparison to another.”133 One way to ensure that asy-
lum-seekers are paroled or, if detained, that detention is in the 
least restrictive manner, is to increase predictability of asylum-
seekers absconding by improving data collection via risk as-
sessments.134 
An interesting parallel can be drawn to recent risk and data 
collection paradigms the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol 
(“CBP”) has utilized, in the context of national security, regard-
ing the flow of people and goods through U.S. borders.135 In re-
sponse to increasing terror threats against the United States, 
CBP has utilized improved data analysis to distinguish be-
                                                                                                             
 129. Id. 
 130. See SAMPSON, supra note 20, at 22 (“[A]ssessment enables authorities 
to make an informed decision about the most appropriate way to manage and 
support the individual as they seek to resolve their migration status and to 
make case-by-case decisions about the need to detain or not.”). 
 131. See Unlocking Liberty, supra note 20, at 41–42 (identifying the short-
comings of “standard risk assessment” as opposed to individualized risk as-
sessment). 
 132. See Alternatives to Detention, supra note 11, at 24–25. 
 133. Id. at 25. 
 134. SCHRIRO, supra note 18, at 18–19. 
 135. See generally CUSTOMS AND BORDER PATROL, CBP Launches Centers to 
Facilitate Processing of Imports, October 20, 2011, available at 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/national/2011_news_arc
hive/10202011_2.xml. 
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tween safe and unsafe traffic, goods, and passengers.136 Speed-
ing up the screening process for safe traffic actually increased 
CBP’s ability to focus resources on who or what was a true 
threat.137 Essential to speeding up safe traffic is the sharing of 
information not only within an organization but also between 
an organization and “safe” civilians, across multiple agencies, 
and among nations.138 CBP’s efforts provide a model for the 
way that ICE can speed up the parole of safe detainees in order 
to better focus on those that are unsafe.139 Based on CBP’s 
model, the United States might be able to speed asylum-
seekers into parole or ATDs in a number of ways, such as hav-
ing ICE offices become more efficient at reporting factors con-
tributing to or detracting from compliance; requiring ICE and 
NGOs to compile data on asylum-seekers’ compliance; or by 
sharing statistics with Canada and Mexico relating to risks 
posed by asylum-seekers and ultimate compliance.140 The ex-
pedited process could have similar benefits as those seen by 
CBP—the ability to focus finances and personnel on true 
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threats—while also avoiding unnecessary or arbitrary deten-
tion by releasing individuals who qualify into ATDs.141 To en-
sure that the process does not become discriminatory or too bu-
reaucratic, expert input, trained staff, specific guidelines, and 
formal review should be a part of any new data analysis pro-
cess.142 
While overriding long-standing aversions to sharing between 
countries could be a challenge at any level of cooperation, the 
benefits of increased data sharing and analysis in this digit-
ized, information-driven society outweigh the drawbacks.143 
Data regarding compliance on a national or international level 
could influence detention planning on the whole and decisions 
made in individual cases in the same way data from pilot pro-
grams have already shaped decisions on a smaller scale.144 Ul-
timately, by “designing effective alternatives to detention and 
knowing when they can and should be relied upon to work,” 
risk analysis, supplemented by data collection, can help to re-
duce unnecessary and arbitrary detention.145 
C. Why Alternatives to Detention are Important 
In the spectrum between full detention and unrestrained lib-
erty, ATDs occupy any method that is not at either extreme.146 
These methods include, from the most to the least restrictive: 
in-home detention and electronic monitoring; supervision or 
reporting; residency restrictions; release to community super-
vision; release on bail, bond, or surety; and documentation.147 It 
is important to note, however, that just because a given method 
has been classified as an ATD does not mean it necessarily 
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complies with international law.148 The intensity of a given 
ATD method varies, but in order to avoid violating internation-
al legal mandates it should comport with the level of risk estab-
lished via risk-analysis on a case-by-case basis.149 Because of 
this, asylum-seekers already eligible for parole without re-
strictions should not be placed in ATD programs that are more 
restrictive than parole as doing so would result in more re-
strictions on liberty than necessary.150 ATDs should be utilized 
for those asylum-seekers who do not require more restrictive 
deprivations of liberty, such as detention, and not as a substi-
tute for lesser restrictions like release on parole.151 
Many ATD methods, if implemented properly, could allow the 
United States to harmonize the delicate balance between the 
systemic risks that lead to over-detention and the international 
human rights laws that only authorize detention as a last re-
sort.152 This is because many ATDs occupy a middle ground, 
addressing the risks that detention is intended to prevent 
while allowing the asylum-seeker to be free from unnecessary 
or arbitrary detention.153 Some programs utilize residency re-
strictions in a variety of ways, including “open centers, semi-
open centers, [or] directed residence” that often allow the asy-
lum-seeker to be released into the community with varying lev-
els of supervision.154 The most successful ATD programs utilize 
a combination of ATD methods designed to meet the needs and 
risks of individual asylum-seekers.155 
Yet even some ATD programs can violate international law; 
methods such as home detention and electronic tagging are 
“very intensive” methods in relation to the restrictions they 
place on liberty and can rise to the level of detention despite 
technical release.156 It is possible that even allowing for release 
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on bail, bond, or surety—often considered less restrictive and 
typically involving no more restrictions on liberty than a finan-
cial or vouch-person guarantee—may violate international law 
where asylum-seekers remain unnecessarily detained simply 
because they have little access to funds or community sponsors, 
and not because they pose a threat.157 As such, implementing 
these methods alone may not bring the United States into com-
pliance with international law.158 
One example of a successful NGO pilot ATD program is the 
community supervision experiment titled “Appearance Assis-
tance Program” (“AAP”), developed and tested in the late 1990s 
by the Vera Institute of Justice at the request of then-extant 
INS.159 The program provided for asylum-seekers classified in 
its “intensive” track160 to be released from detention to the su-
pervision of AAP staff.161 The supervision included monthly 
monitoring and reporting requirements—both in person and 
via phone—and repeated flight-risk evaluations.162 AAP also 
offered support to asylum-seekers by giving information about 
obligations, hearing dates, the legal process, and the available 
services within the community.163 By utilizing strategic intake 
interviews and supervision that had the potential to alert AAP 
staff of participant non-compliance or the threat thereof, AAP 
staff were able to recommend decreased, constant, or increased 
supervision, or even redetention if necessary.164 Not only did 
asylum-seeker participants have high appearance rates at 
court dates165—93%—thereby addressing the risks used to jus-
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tify categorical detention,166 but the program also reduced un-
necessary detention by presuming release and only redetaining 
those who violated the conditions of release or who truly were a 
flight risk.167 
III. IMMIGRATION, DETENTION, AND PATH DEPENDENCY 
Despite the expansive reach of ICE and DHS detention pow-
ers, the United States is on the edge of immigration reforms 
that have the potential to change the face of the immigration 
system and could bring the country within the standards man-
dated by international laws.168 The Obama Administration be-
gan to discuss an overhaul of the immigration detention system 
in response to an unfavorable report by a DHS consultant.169 
Since then, a series of developments has energized the reform 
advocates seeking to alter the status quo of immigration and 
detention in the United States.170 Attorney General Eric Holder 
made a 2011 announcement (“PD Memo”) that granted discre-
tion to ICE officers to decline prosecution or detention in a 
number of situations, including those pertaining to asylum-
seekers.171 Additionally, in late 2011, DHS began a review of 
300,000 immigration cases with the aim of implementing the 
PD Memo and allowing the department to focus its limited re-
sources on “deporting foreigners who committed serious crimes 
or pose national security risks.”172 Furthermore, ICE has re-
cently developed and begun testing a risk assessment tool to be 
used in determining parole-eligibility for detainees, slated for 
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nationwide implementation in 2012.173 The United States has 
also consolidated multiple former ATD programs into one – the 
Intensive Supervision Appearance Program II (“ISAP II”) – and 
executed a contract with a private company to administer it.174 
Finally, several senators introduced a bill during the 112th ses-
sion to enact “comprehensive immigration reform” which in-
cludes provisions for the protection of asylum-seekers.175 
The importance of this reform momentum can be illustrated 
by the theory of path dependency, first popularized by econo-
mist Paul David in the mid-eighties, wherein “individual deci-
sion[-]making early on in the path may lead to a ‘lock-in’ of a 
pattern that is collectively suboptimal.”176 To illustrate the the-
ory, David examined the series of decisions made by individual 
business owners and individual typists to buy and be trained 
on QWERTY keyboard models. The purchase of these key-
boards led to the “lock-in”, or enduring prominence, of the 
suboptimal keyboard configuration long after the technology 
that required said layout had been phased out.177 The lock-in of 
a given method creates “the very heavy disincentives that face 
those who would wish to depart significantly from that which 
has gone before,” and acts to reinforce the existing situation.178 
It is significantly more difficult to alter the course after the 
method becomes “locked-in” because of the “technical interre-
latedness, economies of scale, and quasi-irreversibility of in-
vestment” that lead to the method becoming entrenched de-
spite other, better, methods being available.179 
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The U.S. detention of asylum-seekers is similar to the 
QWERTY conundrum.180 The prominence of the presumption in 
favor of detention can be, in part, explained by the positive 
feedback loop between the public and political responses to ter-
rorism.181 Decisions made in response to terrorism have con-
tributed to the prominence of mandatory detention for asylum-
seekers, at least until they can prove they are not a risk.182 
Now it is clear that categorical mandatory detention is subop-
timal, as it violates international laws.183 Despite being obso-
lete, the presumption in favor of detention might now be 
locked-in because it is easier to continue using it than to alter 
infrastructure and training to facilitate eliminating it.184 
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Digressing from the path is not impossible.185 Radical devia-
tions from the status quo become more likely when institution-
al frameworks that keep to the current path, like ICE policies 
in favor of detention, meet with unpredictable external forces, 
like the current momentum for U.S. immigration and detention 
reform.186 Like political reform momentum, external forces in 
the path dependency context are “fleeting comings together of a 
number of diverse elements into a new, single combination.”187 
Because of this, U.S. immigration and detention reform is at a 
critical juncture where immense change is possible.188 It is es-
sential that the United States capitalize on this opportunity 
and reform in a way that brings its practice into compliance 
with international law standards as this moment is fleeting 
and changes in the elements, such as the inauguration of a new 
political party into power, could close the window of opportuni-
ty.189 In addition to haste, it is imperative to alter the status 
quo in a way that does actually bring the United States within 
international law mandates because anything else could poten-
tially lock-in a new, equally suboptimal method.190 
IV. IGNORING RECOMMENDATIONS OF ASYLUM EXPERTS LEADS 
TO INEFFICIENT REFORMS IN THE ASYLUM DETENTION SYSTEM 
Rather than taking full advantage of the opportunity to bring 
its immigration and detention system into compliance with in-
ternational human rights law, the United States has construc-
tively ignored the recommendations of asylum experts and, 
thus, recent efforts at progress have failed to amount to any 
significant decrease in unnecessary or arbitrary detention.191 In 
                                                                                                             
 185. David, supra note 23, at 334. 
 186. Wilsford, supra note 178, at 270. 
 187. Id. at 256–58, 270. 
 188. See generally, id. 
 189. See, id. at 254. 
 190. See, David, supra note 23, at 336, stating 
Despite the presence of the sort of externalities that standard static 
analysis tells us would interfere with the achievement of the socially 
optimal degree of system compatibility, competition in the absence of 
perfect futures markets drove the industry prematurely into stand-
ardization on the wrong system – where decentralized decision mak-
ing subsequently has sufficed to hold it. (emphasis in original). 
 191. Compare Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 6, with Pres-
ton, supra note 7. 
2012] OVER-DETENTION 481 
some instances NGOs have achieved high success rates in de-
signing and piloting programs that implement their recom-
mendations for risk analysis and ATDs.192 However, as this 
Part will illustrate, the United States has repeatedly decided 
against implementing their recommendations and has instead 
moved toward a suboptimal path in which reformed programs 
continue to violate international obligations.193 
A. The United States Takes Steps Toward Suboptimal Risk-
Analysis 
When ICE, DHS, and the Obama Administration pledged an 
overhaul of the U.S. immigration and detention system, they 
identified the need for a risk assessment mechanism that 
would facilitate non-citizens in being either paroled or enrolled 
into ATD programs.194 At the beginning of 2010, ICE worked 
with various NGOs, led by the Lutheran Immigration and Ref-
ugee Service (“LIRS”), to develop this “risk assessment tool.”195 
The exact details of this tool have not been made public.196 
However, both LIRS and Human Rights First indicated that 
ICE’s tool is designed to use “objective criteria to guide deci-
sion-making regarding whether or not an alien should be de-
tained or released; the alien’s custody classification level, if de-
tained; and the alien’s level of community supervision (to in-
clude an ICE ATD program), if released.”197 LIRS noted that 
the tool “includes mathematically weighted factors that should 
signal the likelihood of threat to the community based on past 
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behavior as well as of absconding for each and every individual 
ICE apprehends.”198 
The tool, slated for nationwide implementation in 2012, has 
already garnered criticism from those to whom ICE has grant-
ed advanced exposure.199 In reviewing a pilot version, the 
UNHCR expressed concern that the “tool, based on a mathe-
matical calculation, risks becoming a bureaucratic, tick-box ex-
ercise and may lead only to artificial individual assessments 
rather than real ones. It also appears heavily weighted in fa-
vour of detention.”200 Based on these assessments, it seems that 
this aspect of ICE’s tool could become arbitrary and thus would 
not satisfy international obligations.201 The continued pre-
sumption for detention also violates the guidance for imple-
menting the policies advocated in the UDHR, 1951 Convention, 
1967 Protocol, and ICCPR.202 
Furthermore, although designed subsequent to ICE consulta-
tions with NGOs specializing in asylee and refugee protec-
tion,203 the tool apparently falls short of asylum experts’ rec-
ommendations.204 LIRS, after providing support to ICE in the 
development stages of the tool, found it contains a “total ab-
sence of individualized assessment of risk for people subject to 
mandatory detention. There is also no standard assessment of 
risk with judicial review for people eligible for parole, such as 
arriving asylum-seekers who are found to have a credible fear 
of return.”205 These apparent shortcomings affect the ability of 
the United States to sufficiently satisfy international standards 
by, specifically, avoiding arbitrariness through individualized 
assessments and judicial review.206 
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By ignoring the recommendations of LIRS and other asylum 
experts involved in the development of the tool, ICE squan-
dered a valuable opportunity to comply with international 
law.207 Subsequent to viewing ICE’s new tool, LIRS published 
their recommendations to ICE regarding a risk assessment 
tool.208 It envisions a dynamic individualized assessment pro-
cedure that encourages release, or, if some form of detention is 
necessary, the least restrictive ATD or detention procedure 
necessary to mitigate the risks presented by the individual al-
ien.209 It also allows for review of a determination should there 
be a change in circumstances or risk factors for an asylum-
seeker.210 Had ICE adopted a risk-assessment tool in line with 
these recommendations, it would allow for a greater chance of 
eliminating arbitrary, unnecessary detention.211 Instead, ICE 
has selected a suboptimal path that has the potential to “lock-
in” continuing violations of international human rights law for 
future iterations of the tool.212 
B. ICE Takes Steps Toward Suboptimal ATDs 
In 2004, Congress approved funding for ATD programs and 
ICE solicited bids for the contract to manage them.213 Various 
NGOs—including the Vera Institute—bid for the contract, bas-
ing their qualifications on their expertise in refugee, asylee, 
and immigration services.214 In a further example of the United 
States selecting to move down a suboptimal path, ICE “gave 
the contract to Behavioral Interventions Inc., a private compa-
ny whose model was based on the use of electronic monitor-
ing.”215 Behavioral Interventions Inc. (“BI”) and its parent com-
pany still hold the U.S. ATD contract.216 
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Commonly used in the criminal judicial system, home curfew 
and electronic tagging are the most restrictive ATDs, and, as 
noted above, are considered by some to be an additional form of 
detention.217 BI currently uses ICE’s congressional ATD fund-
ing to combine those most restrictive methods with reporting 
requirements—“installation of biometric voice recognition soft-
ware, unannounced home visits, employer verification, and in-
person reporting to supervise participants”218—to administer a 
single program: the Intensive Supervision Appearance Pro-
gram II (“ISAP II”).219 While for the first time in 2009 ICE in-
cluded the presence of a “needs-based case management com-
ponent” as a requirement for a company to obtain the ATD con-
tract, this appears to be an as yet unfulfilled commitment.220 In 
looking at the restrictive nature of these methods, scholars 
have noted, “sometimes what is called an alternative to deten-
tion may in fact be an alternative form of detention.”221 
This is especially true when considering that “rather than 
looking to the current detention populations and utilizing vari-
ous supervision methods as a step down from unnecessary de-
tention, [ISAP II] is seeking individuals already released into 
the community to increase restrictions of liberty on more peo-
ple.”222 The use of ISAP II in these scenarios remains arbitrary 
and subject to the discretion of the ICE officer analyzing the 
parole eligibility of an asylum-seeker.223 For example, while 
“[a]liens should be assigned conditions of supervision according 
to an assessment of the alien’s flight risk and danger to the 
community[, in ISAP II] assignment to a[n ATD] program is 
determined in part by residency,” as only those asylum-seekers 
detained in close proximity to a regional ISAP II office are eli-
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gible to participate.224 “ICE has not requested-and Congress 
has yet to authorize-sufficient funding to expand ATD pro-
grams nationally-so that any immigration detainee who is eli-
gible for an ATD program could be placed into it.”225 
Furthermore, ICE’s plan for ISAP II “would not use ATDs as 
an alternative that would decrease the use of existing detention 
beds…[t]he total number of individuals in ICE custody or su-
pervision, whether detained on Alternatives to Detention, 
would increase under this plan.”226 Thus, the United States 
continues to unnecessarily detain parole-eligible asylum-
seekers by placing them into ISAP II.227 “ICE’s plan also explic-
itly precludes the use of ATDs for individuals who are techni-
cally subject to ‘mandatory detention.’”228 
V. POLICY BENEFITS TO UNITED STATES SHOULD IT ADOPT THE 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
In addition to the benefit of being in compliance with interna-
tional human rights laws, there are numerous advantages for 
the United States should it adopt the proposed programs.229 
First, the country can maintain its status as a leader in the in-
ternational community in good faith, and a stance of internal 
compliance will better position the country to encourage other 
nations to follow suit.230 Next, much of U.S. foreign policy in 
the war on terror depends on how the country is perceived in 
the international community and among individual popula-
tions.231 Because many people will still be deported, how they 
feel about the process and what they say to others upon return 
to their countries may have an impact on public image in areas 
where the United States desperately needs support.232 A repu-
tation of humanitarian treatment and fair dealings could go a 
long way. 
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Finally, there is an enormous potential for financial sav-
ings.233 Currently, it costs $95 per day to detain an asylum-
seeker, but only $22 per day to support that same person in an 
alternative program.234 Some estimate that the disparity could 
be even more extreme, with ICE overhead costs bringing deten-
tion costs up to $164 per detainee per day while some forms of 
ATDs cost as little as thirty cents per day.235 While the num-
bers include more than just asylum-seekers, the savings asso-
ciated with detaining only those who present a true risk, such 
as only detaining those who have “committed violent crimes, 
the agency could save nearly $4.4 million a night, or $1.6 bil-
lion annually—an 82% reduction in costs.”236 
CONCLUSION  
When coupled with an efficient and individualized risk anal-
ysis program, Alternatives to Detention adequately address the 
risks of releasing the majority of asylum-seekers into the com-
munity during the pendency of their asylum processing.237 In-
stituting this combination would benefit the United States fi-
nancially and in its international standing in addition to allow-
ing the United States to comply with its international human 
rights obligations regarding the detention of asylum-seekers.238 
The United States should move quickly to adopt the recom-
mendations of asylum experts, capitalizing on the current mo-
mentum for reform in the detention system and decisively end-
ing its violations of international human rights laws. 
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